Sociology and Human Rights Education: Beyond the Three Generations?

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Abstract
This article examines the uses and limitations of the prevailing classificatory schema in the field of human rights—a tripartite framework that delineates first-generation civil and political rights ensuring liberty, second-generation economic and social rights promoting equality, and third-generation group and cultural rights supporting solidarity. When applied strictly, the framework runs the risk of reifying the three categories, exaggerating the impact of the European Enlightenment on contemporary norms, and overlooking the historical contexts in which rights-claims emerge. Though useful for analytic and pedagogical purposes, the existing paradigm fails to capture the full spectrum of human rights violations and solutions in the contemporary world. More precisely, it fails to account for the intersections among different types of rights. To the end of renovating the paradigm, this article advances the principles of holism, globalism, and historicism as tools for human rights educators.

Keywords
Human Rights Education, Rights Bundling, UN, NGOs

It is commonplace to divide human rights into three categories: civil and political rights (including individual protections, the right to assembly, the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, and voting rights); economic and social rights (including protections from the fluctuations of the market, along with the rights to a fair wage, unemployment insurance, and social security); and group and cultural rights (including the rights to maintain traditional customs, inhabit the lands and use the waterways of a group’s ancestors, and receive an education in a minority language). Since the late 1970s, scholars, policymakers, and activists—especially in the US and elsewhere in the global North—have tended to employ the three-generations paradigm in interpreting the declarations and campaigns of the United Nations Organization (UN) and such NGOs as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). For their part, in serving as pro-
ducers and disseminators of knowledge about human rights, the UN, AI, HRW, and other organizations have predicated their human rights education programs on the three-generations paradigm. (For the UN’s program, see http://www.un.org/en/rights/; for AI’s program, see http://www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights/human-rights-by-topic/; for HRW’s program, see http://www.hrw.org/en/our-work./)

In the process, these organizations have exerted a profound influence on the public reception of such canonical texts as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - the three components of the putative International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) (United Nations Organization 1948, 1966a, 1966b). Phrased differently, the three-generations paradigm - though formalized by Karel Vasak, then Secretary-General of the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, three decades after the promulgation of the UDHR and more than a decade after the promulgation of the ICCPR and the ICESCR - has shaped both the scholarly exegesis and the popularization of the three of documents (Vasak 1977). Following Vasak’s precedent, theorists and practitioners of human rights have routinely assumed that a precursor of the three-generations paradigm found its tentative expression in the UDHR and its definitive elaboration in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Though plausible, this assumption has obstructed many scholars, organizations, and educators from taking stock of the new forms of human rights thinking emanating from mass mobilizations in the global South.

Notwithstanding its analytic and pedagogical utility, the three-generations approach - when applied strictly - makes it difficult to capture the full range of human rights abuses and remedies in the ‘real world.’ Thus, in defining poverty, social inequalities (based on race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and national origin), and environmental destruction as violations that cut across the three categories, sociologists imply that the solutions - to be found, presumably, in the form of government policies that promote poverty alleviation (or alternative development), greater social equality, compensation for historical injustices, and environmental restoration - must be holistic or totalizing. In acknowledging the indivisibility of human rights -
both at the theoretical and the practical levels - sociologists have proposed ‘rights bundles’ or packages of organically connected rights that transcend the conventional categories (Blau and Moncada 2005: 51-64).

To the end of demonstrating the advantages of a more holistic, global, and historically sensitive approach to human rights, this article defends three rights bundles (or collections of social entitlements): ‘longevity’ (consisting of the rights to food, housing, healthcare, and a clean ecosystem); the ‘full development of the person’ (consisting of the rights to a nurturing milieu, an education, occupational training, leisure activities, and identity choices), and ‘peace’ (consisting of protections from interstate warfare, civil strife, crimes against humanity, and the structural violence stemming from racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia) (Frezzo 2011). It is the author’s hope that human rights educators - whether employed by universities, affiliated with NGOs, or engaged in community organizing - will not only adopt these rights bundles, but also cultivate the habit of devising new rights bundles to meet the needs of their constituencies. It is in the act of inventing, honing, and defending rights bundles that students and community members come to understand the remarkable malleability and efficacy of the discourse of human rights.

This article is divided into five sections. The first section explores the recent surge of interest in human rights among social scientists - a significant but largely unanticipated development in the academy. The second section examines the theoretical problems associated with the three-generations paradigm, while the third section addresses the historical problems surrounding the paradigm. Extrapolating the insights of scholars who have emphasized the indivisibility of human rights and the consequent need for rights bundling, the fourth section elaborates an immanent critique of the three-generations paradigm. Drawing on a renovated version of the paradigm, the conclusion offers a new reading of the IBHR, and then traces the ramifications of this reading for human rights education.

Social Scientists and Human Rights

Though once the province of philosophers and legal scholars, the study of human rights has been institutionalized by the social
Pioneering the social scientific study of human rights, political scientists—especially those bridging the gap between the subfields of comparative politics (with its focus on voting behavior, party politics, regimes, repression, and democratization) and international relations (with its focus on diplomacy, security, interstate rivalry, intergovernmental organizations, and peacemaking)—have tended to place particular emphasis on first-generation civil and political rights (e.g., voting rights, citizenship, and the rights to association, assembly, speech, and public protest) (Brysk 2002). Having arrived on the scene more recently, sociologists (especially in the subfields of social movements, organizations, law, development, and political economy) have tended to emphasize economic and social rights (e.g., the rights to a livelihood, unemployment compensation, social security, and healthcare) (Frezzo 2011). For their part, anthropologists (especially those focusing on the life-ways of non-Western societies) have tended to privilege group and cultural rights (e.g., the rights to maintain indigenous traditions, inhabit indigenous lands, protect local forms of knowledge, speak a minority language, and practice a minority religion) (Goodale 2006). Finally, geographers (especially those focusing on the relations between humans and the environment) have been inclined to stress environmental rights (e.g., the rights human beings have to arable land, supplies of pure water, clean air, and a sustainable form of production and/or the rights of the earth itself) placed either in the category of third-generation rights or in the recently-proposed category of ‘fourth-generation’ rights (American Association of Geographers 2008).

Doubtless, there has been considerable overlap among the concerns of sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers—not least because many sociologists have undertaken fieldwork, alongside their counterparts in anthropology and geography, in regions of the global South that have been marred by interstate war, civil strife, crimes against humanity, extreme poverty, and environmental destruction (Hajjar 2005). In the process, sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers have witnessed, and in some cases assisted, the work of the NGOs, social movement organizations (SMOs), and community-based organizations (CBOs) that grapple with the repercussions of systemic violence and resist such neoliberal policies as fiscal austerity,
privatization, deregulation, financial liberalization, and free trade. In expressing their demands in the language of human rights, such coalitions of NGOs, SMOs, and CBOs have inspired many sociologists to join interdisciplinary institutes and programs in human rights. Taken together, the social sciences - especially sociology, anthropology, and geography - have made considerable headway in challenging the rigid distinctions among first, second, and third-generation rights.

The case of sociology - a discipline that tolerates theoretical and methodological pluralism, proves reluctant to confine itself to the analysis of ‘civil society’ (as distinguished from economic relations, the legal environment, the political system, or the cultural milieu), and routinely assimilates insights from such neighboring disciplines as political science, anthropology, and geography - is particularly instructive. As a consequence of their training in such theoretical currents as Marxism, feminism, post-colonial theory, post-structuralism, and post-modernism, sociologists have tended to express skepticism about the universalist claims of human rights discourse - for example, by pointing to possible class, gender, race, and cultural biases inscribed in the canonical texts (or, alternatively, built into the contexts in which such texts are interpreted). This healthy skepticism about pretensions to universality has influenced even those sociologists who opt to study human rights (Wallerstein 2006). Yet the construction of a defensible, non-Eurocentric, universalism remains an aspiration for many sociologists in the field. Arguably, the future of human rights education depends on the elaboration of a universalism that protects cultural diversity.

In light of recent advances in the sociology of human rights - a nascent field of academic inquiry that analyzes ‘rights-claims’ (i.e., the role of social actors in devising and propagating competing interpretations of the human rights canon) and ‘rights-effects’ (i.e., the role of rights in empowering and/or constraining social actors) - this article examines the following questions: To what extent does the three-generations framework remain useful in encouraging students and the public as a whole to think systematically about the applications of human rights doctrine? How have sociologists grappled with human rights violations that exceed the conventional categories? How have sociologists moved beyond the conventional categories in
proposing new rights?

In addressing the aforementioned questions, this article argues that the three-generations framework - though useful in sketching the rights available to the planet as whole, societies, communities, and individuals in the 21st century - proves insufficient either to diagnose a broad range of real-world human rights abuses or to propose a set of real-world human rights remedies. For this reason, sociologists of human rights have begun to define poverty, enduring social inequalities (deriving from institutional racism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia), and environmental destruction not merely as social problems, but also as human rights abuses (i.e., power structures and practices that violate - whether intentionally or inadvertently - the emerging norms that find expression in a dense network of UN agencies, NGOs, SMOs, CBOs) (Blau and Moncada 2009). If such human rights abuses as poverty, social inequalities, and environmental degradation routinely transcend the categories of first-generation civil and political rights, second-generation economic and social rights, and third-generation group and cultural rights, then human rights remedies - whatever form they may take - must capture the intersections of the three categories. This insight harbors significant repercussions for human rights education. But it also points to the need to work through a series of theoretical and historical problems.

Theoretical Problems

The three-generations framework is marred by a number of theoretical problems. Though useful in pointing to the array of rights spanning the 'spheres' of the economy, the polity, society, and culture - available to human beings in the present day, the three-generations framework runs the risk of: (a) reinforcing false dichotomies between different categories of rights (for example, by proposing an irresolvable contradiction between liberty and equality), (b) over-emphasizing the influence of the European Enlightenment on contemporary norms (for example, by asserting that the West should serve as a model for the non-West in implementing rights in a sequential manner), and (c) ignoring the historical contexts in which rights-claims are advanced, interpreted, and contested (for example, by generalizing across historical time or by failing to take into considera-
tion the contingencies associated with the accumulation of rights in communities, societies, and the world as a whole). Taken together, the risks of atomism, Eurocentrism, and historical imprecision have the effect of muddling the major debates in the ‘human rights community’ - a collection of academics, public intellectuals, journalists, UN officials, government policymakers, NGO staff, and activists, representing different constituencies and espousing competing interpretations of the human rights canon. These debates include universalism versus particularism, negative rights versus positive rights, and individual rights versus collective rights.

Why are these risks significant? First, false oppositions among different types of rights can prevent scholars, teachers, and activists from capturing the interconnectedness of human rights issues in practice. For example, the problem of poverty - though falling primarily into the category of second-generation rights (including the right to a minimum standard of living) - touches on first-generation rights (including the right to own property) and third-generation rights (including the right to traditional life-ways). Similarly, the problem of environmental degradation - though often placed in the category of third-generation rights or, alternatively, relegated to the under-theorized category of ‘fourth-generation rights’ - inevitably traverses the three generations in raising questions of the ownership, possession, and use of land and waterways, the extraction of natural resources, the disposal of waste, and the sustainability of a regime of mass consumption that privileges a small minority of the world’s population. While the problem of atomism can be exacerbated by the boundaries that separate the social scientific disciplines and thereby foment the illusion that human life unfolds in separate spheres, it is encouraging that that political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists often collaborate in interdisciplinary institutes - a gesture that testifies both to the need for and to the feasibility of a more holistic vision of human rights.

The second risk derives from the exaggeration of the role of the European Enlightenment in defining the contours of human rights in the years since the US Revolution (1776-1781) and the French Revolution (1789-1799). Notwithstanding the contributions of world-systems analysis, post-colonial theory, subaltern studies, and related currents in globally-oriented social thought, Eurocentrism - the
belief, whether explicit or implicit, that the ascendance of the pan-European realm to a position of dominance in the global system can be attributed to the continent’s cultural superiority (or ingrained penchant for hard work, risk-taking, nautical exploration, scientific innovation, and technological ingenuity) - has remained entrenched in many disciplines even though multiculturalism has made considerable headway in the academy (Wallerstein 2006). To put it differently, institutional or covert Eurocentrism has the effect not only of downplaying the contributions of non-Western societies - whether at the dawn of ‘modernity’ or in the ‘age of globalization’ - to the human rights canon, but also of promoting a developmentalist or, in the extreme, a teleological vision of human rights.

Closely related to the problem of Eurocentrism - yet worthy of separate treatment - the third risk derives from the tendency to ignore the historical contexts in which old rights are reinterpreted and new rights are invented. What does it mean to assert that old rights are continually reinterpreted, while new rights are periodically invented? Is it possible to find a middle ground between strict essentialism (i.e., the assertion that human beings have a fixed essence that can be isolated, for once and for all, by science and/or named definitively by philosophy) and strict social constructionism (i.e., the contention that human beings lack a definable nature and hence engage in strategic storytelling about their lives)? On the one hand, this article does not rule out the possibility that human rights have an ontological foundation in human physiology (e.g., the need for food, clothing, shelter, nurturing, and protection from harm) and the seemingly universal tendency on the part of humans to form bands, communities, and societies (Turner 2006). One the other hand, this article acknowledges that rights-claims find meaning and efficacy in specific historical contexts. Nevertheless, without lapsing into a Whig conception of human history as a progressive march to Enlightenment and beyond, it is possible to demarcate the long-term expansion of what is ‘thinkable’ in terms of human rights. Hence the question arises: How do plausible rights-claims accumulate? Far from being confined to specific locations in historical time and geographic space, rights-claims spread in both predictable and unforeseen ways. Yet, in crossing temporal and spatial boundaries, rights-claims undergo a process of translation - both literally and figuratively - and find themselves encoded
differently and attached to new constituencies and power-blocs. It follows that what is ‘thinkable’ as human rights depends not only on the accumulation of past struggles (e.g., movements of workers, women, people of color, inhabitants of colonies, indigenous peoples, and innumerable other identity groups successfully pressuring governments and other authorities to make concessions), but also on the norms, customs, and practices that prevail in a given society in a specific historical period (Ishay 2008). Such conventions shape the perception of rights that have been achieved in other societies or in previous times. One of the features of world-historical sociology is its capacity to make comparisons of rights-regimes across historical time and geographic space - a project that falls beyond the purview of this article.

How might we ameliorate the aforementioned theoretical problems? To the end of mitigating the risks of atomism, Eurocentrism, and historical imprecision, this article proposes not to jettison the three-generations paradigm in toto - a gesture that would dampen the efficacy of existing programs in human rights education - but rather to transform the paradigm by employing the following principles: (1) holism, which maintains that the three categories of human rights are inextricable from one another - not least because human rights abuses and remedies inevitably traverse the three categories in the ‘real world’; (2) globalism, which contends that the genesis and spread of rights discourse across national and cultural boundaries should be examined in the context of the evolution of capitalism as a global system; and (3) historicism, which claims that what is thinkable in terms of human rights - though often cumulative - varies dramatically from one historical period to another. In sum, these three principles hold the key to renovating the three-generations paradigm to meet the needs of students, NGOs, SMOs, and CBOs in the globalization era.

Doubtless, globalization - defined as increasing economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental interdependency, the growth of a global public sphere (mediated by the Internet and other advanced communications technologies), pervasive industrial relocation attendant to the post-Fordist work regime, the systematic ‘retreat of the state’ from the social programs that had been implemented by welfare, socialist, and developmental states from the late 1940s through the early 1970s, and the widespread experience of accelerated
historical time and contracted geographic space - has fomented in-numer able alliances of NGOs, SMOs, and CBOs across national and cultural boundaries (Smith 2007). Even though such alliances have routinely found common ground in the discourse of human rights, it remains for social scientists and human rights educators not only to transform the three-generations paradigm, but also to propose new rights bundles as part of a dialogue with popular mobilizations.

**Historical Problems**

The principle of historicism points to the following question: Under what historical conditions did the three-generations paradigm, with its intellectual debt to the Enlightenment philosophers, find expression in such UN documents as the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR? How might we isolate the historicity of the paradigm? Interestingly enough, the three-generations paradigm is so thoroughly entrenched among scholars and educators that its origin is rarely discussed. Yet the schema’s history has influenced its use in manifold ways. More precisely, the schema is history-laden insofar as it bears the marks of the US-led post-Second World War reconstruction of the global economy and interstate system, along with the concomitant invention of the three-worlds perspective - with the ‘First World’ defined as the capitalist West and Japan, the ‘Second World’ defined as the socialist East, and the ‘Third World’ defined as the former-European colonies and other poor countries.

Promoted by scholars in development studies and adopted by the UN, in both its administrative and its knowledge-producing functions, the three-worlds perspective contributed to the linking of rights discourse not only with Keynesianism and social democracy, but also with developmentalism (i.e., the notion that the Third World should implement programmed industrialization in order to catch-up to the standard of living achieved by the West) (Rist 2002). This accounts not only for the overwhelmingly positive reception of the ICESCR in the Third World, but also for the widespread tendency on the part of development scholars and UN staff to emphasize the putative ‘right to development.’ This tendency reached its apex in the early 1970s with the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) - a proposal to renegotiate the terms of the global economy in light of the failure of mainstream
development policies. Amidst much fanfare, the NIEO was ratified by the UN General Assembly and summarily rejected by the US and other powers - a watershed event that accelerated the catastrophic transition from development proper to neoliberalism (Rist 2002). After the failure of the NIEO, the UN drifted away from the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB) - a process that altered the dynamics of the global system and eventually nullified the efficacy of the three-worlds perspective.

How did the three-generations framework gain saliency? Following the convention established by Vasak (1977) - a Czech scholar who opted to remain in France after the project of expanding civil liberties and building 'socialism with a human face' was crushed by Soviet tanks in 1968 - scholars and educators in the field of human rights have presented the three-generations framework as an elaboration of the French revolutionary slogan, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!' Fittingly, the International Institute of Human Rights - the organization for which Vasak worked from the time of his defection until 1980 - had been founded by René Cassin, who had represented France on disarmament and collective security matters in the League of Nations from 1924 to 1938, served as one of the framers of the UDHR in the late 1940s, and received the Nobel Peace Prize for his research, institution-building, advocacy in 1968. Renowned for his contributions to the theory and practice of human rights, Cassin left his stamp on the organizational culture and substantive interests of the Institute. In retrospect, it seems likely that Vasak and his colleagues at the Institute were aware of the possibility that the three-generations framework would get caught up in the two most significant problems confronting the UN: the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union and the process of decolonization, nation-building, and development in the Third World. Nevertheless, they promoted the approach as a tool for legal scholars, social scientists, UN officials, NGO staff, and human rights educators.

The aforementioned biographical details offer important clues about the world-historical context in which the three-generations framework was formalized. Marred by a downturn in the global economy, the period brought a hangover from the popular upsurge, political foment, and cultural shift of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The First World experienced widespread reactions to the new
social movements that had been formed by opponents of the Vietnam War, supporters of minority rights, feminists, students pushing for the reform of the educational system, advocates of LGBT rights, practitioners of alternative lifestyles, proponents of ecology, and other civil society groups. Meanwhile, the Second World experienced the spread of internal challenges to Stalinism - a process that had begun with the rebellions in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956, before reaching a fever pitch in the Prague Spring of 1968. Framed by the weakening of US hegemony and the descent of the Soviet Union into bureaucratic sclerosis, the Third World witnessed the end of the cycle of anti-colonial revolt and the construction of independent yet precarious regimes. These changes had a pronounced effect on the landscape of human rights.

Though increasingly inclined to emphasize the need for client states, non-aligned states, and adversarial states to respect human rights, the US manifested ambivalence for the ICCPR, harbored serious doubts about the ICESCR, attached reservations, declarations, and understandings to both Covenants, and persisted in its refusal to grant such treaties 'self-executing' status (thereby precluding the treaties from affecting the interpretation of the Constitution or being applied to federal, state, or local laws) (Blau, Brunsma, Moncada, and Zimmer 2008). For their part, the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Bloc states favored the ICESCR, with its ostensible affinities to the socialist ethos, over the ICCPR - a treaty that effectively denied the legitimacy of authoritarian governments. Finally, most countries in the Third World - especially members of the Non-Aligned Movement and Soviet client states - preferred the ICESCR because of the treaty's emphasis on the right to national self-determination. Taken together, these factors routinely blocked human rights educators from capturing the fundamental unity of human rights. Now that the sun has set on the Cold War and the corresponding three-worlds perspective, the climate seems considerably more propitious for a recuperation of the unity of human rights through a sustained dialogue among social scientists, human rights educators, policymakers, and activists.

An Immanent Critique

How might we renovate the conventional paradigm? It makes sense to begin with a critical reflection on the invocation of the
French Revolution. Though useful as a heuristic device, the paradigm’s reliance on the slogan of the Revolution proves deeply problematic. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, social scientists, UN officials, NGO staff, and human rights educators have often operated not only as if the French Revolution were the quintessential ‘bourgeois revolution,’ but also as if it were possible to draw a straight line from the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) - understood as a ‘model’ document - to the IBHR and beyond. While the three-generations framework has exerted a decisive influence on the prevailing interpretations of the IBHR - an issue that will be examined later in this article - it has also set the stage for two innovations in human rights thinking: the concept of ‘indivisibility,’ which holds that civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and group and cultural rights are fundamentally inextricable from one another; and the related concept of ‘rights bundling,’ which holds that organically connected rights should be presented in packages that cut across the conventional categories. In essence, the concepts of indivisibility and rights bundling can be seen as the outgrowths of a systematic attempt to work through the contradictions, redundancies, gaps, and ambiguities inherent in the three-generations framework. Accordingly, this article takes the next step in undertaking an immanent critique of the framework. Pioneered by Hegel and honed by Marx and the Critical Theorists, the method of immanent critique involves working through the tensions that are built into the text. This method dovetails with the hermeneutic approach advocated by historicists.

What does it mean to emphasize the intersections among different forms of rights? The concept of indivisibility implies a descriptive judgment on actually existing rights. Notwithstanding the pedagogical utility of distinguishing the polity (i.e., the locus of civil and political rights), society (i.e., the locus of economic and social rights), and culture (i.e., the locus of group and cultural rights), it is important to show students that such boundaries do not exist in human experience. In other words, the domains of the polity, society, and culture - though crucial for the production of disciplinary knowledge in a university system that foments specialization - should be presented as social scientific constructs or even as useful fictions that render human life intelligible within certain limits. For its part, the concept of rights bundling - i.e., the process of grouping together
social entitlements - implies a normative judgment on rights that ought to be brought into existence in the future. In fact, in constructing such rights bundles as ‘longevity,’ the ‘full development of the person,’ and ‘peace,’ social scientists and human rights educators would bring together the descriptive and normative dimensions. Thus, rights would be conceptualized not only as properties that societies, communities, and individuals ‘have,’ but also as prerogatives that human beings may reasonably and justifiably expect from states and other authorities. In this way, social scientists and human rights educators may connect a rigorous analysis of actually existing social conditions with an aspiration for a more egalitarian, solidaristic, peaceful, just, and sustainable world.

The aforementioned bundles merit further consideration by human rights educators. First, the right to longevity presupposes the rights to healthful food, pure water, clothing, shelter, healthcare, and a clean environment. Second, the right to the full development of one’s person presupposes the rights to a nurturing milieu (whether a family, a community, or some other type of social formation), a rigorous education, vocational training, leisure time, and the opportunity to develop one’s gender, sexual, and cultural identities. Third, the right to peace - though seemingly self-explanatory - presupposes not only ‘negative peace’ (i.e., the cessation of interstate warfare, civil strife, and such crimes against humanity as genocide, mass rape, and mass torture), but also the overcoming of the structural violence associated with racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia - or the realization of what is known in the interdisciplinary field of peace studies as ‘positive peace’ (or institutional non-violence and justice) at the global, national, and local levels.

Why are these bundles potentially significant for programs in human rights education? In essence, each bundle cuts across first-generation civil and political rights, second-generation economic and social rights, and third-generation group and cultural rights in an instructive manner. Moreover, each bundle entails the recognition of the material needs and the intrinsic sociality of human beings, while appealing for a series of social entitlements to be guaranteed by states or entities performing state functions. Finally, taken together, the three bundles - longevity, the full development of the person, and peace - capture a broad spectrum of rights available to human beings
in the present day. Nevertheless, it is clear that social scientists and human rights educators have the capacity to construct a new array of rights bundles to meet the needs of diverse constituencies. In unveiling the principles of holism, globalism, and historicism, an immanent critique of the reigning paradigm would assist human rights educators in examining such human rights abuses as poverty, social inequalities, and environmental degradation—a set of problems that cannot be addressed adequately by the existing categories. Such a critique would shed light on alternative readings of the IBHR and its successor documents.

**Conclusion: The IBHR and the Trajectory of Human Rights Education**

In light of the aforementioned critique of the three-generations paradigm, it is possible to reconsider the role of the IBHR in human rights education. As stated throughout this article, the IBHR has, for many years, served as the touchstone for organizations engaging in human rights education. Testifying to a consensus in the human rights community, UN agencies, AI, HRW, and other entities have implied—in their pronouncements and campaigns alike—that the three-generations framework was already operational when the three installments of the IBHR were published in the twenty years after the Second World War. Hence the question arises: Why did the framers of the IBHR bracket their holism in favor of an atomistic conception of human rights? In essence, this article has argued that the framers of the IBHR—though receptive to a holistic view of human vulnerabilities, needs, wants, and capabilities—felt compelled to specify different forms of rights. While contemporary researchers can only speculate about the thought-processes of the IBHR’s framers (e.g., by reviewing the statements that accompanied the drafts of the Declaration and the two Covenants), it is clear that the IBHR’s fate followed an unanticipated trajectory. In effect, the specification of the categories of human rights set the stage for a series of debates, factional disputes, and power-struggles—a phenomenon that is characteristic of epistemic communities and knowledge movements. Why would the human rights community be any different?

A deeper answer to the question can be found in an analysis of the world-historical conditions under which US hegemony was
institutionalized. Working in the aftermath of the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the Holocaust, the framers of the IBHR were forced to consider the ramifications of the US-led reconstruction not only of the global economy around the dollar/Wall Street standard, the IMF, the WB, the Marshall Plan, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but also of the interstate system around the UN (Arrighi 1994). Whereas the IMF, the WB, the Marshall Plan, and the GATT excluded the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe, the UN included all of the independent nation-states and bolstered the two superpowers’ rhetorical support for decolonization, nation-building, and development in the poor nations of the world. The rhetorical - as opposed to substantive - character of US and Soviet support for national self-determination and development (whether ‘bourgeois’ or ‘socialist’) became obvious as the superpowers intervened, both politically and militarily, in the Third World (Rist 2002). To make matters more complicated, the UN General Assembly became a cauldron for the ‘Third Worldism’ of the Non-Aligned Movement - an array of nation-states attempting to steer a middle course between the superpowers, while forging diplomatic and trade links to one another. As suggested above, Third Worldism reached its apex in the NIEO. In the period surrounding the promulgation of the NIEO, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and other agencies built on the spirit of Third Worldism in offering alternatives to the developmental model proffered by the IMF and the WB. Falling beyond the purview of this article, the literature on post-development merits further consideration by human rights scholars and educators - not least because the problems of poverty, social inequality, and environmental degradation figure prominently on the agenda of critical development studies (Desai 2002).

The legacy of Third Worldism sheds light on the evolving role of the UN as a custodian of human rights. Whether by design or by accident, the postwar system placed the UN in the unenviable position of bridging two gaps - that between the ‘capitalist West’ and the ‘socialist East’ and that between the ‘developed North’ and the ‘underdeveloped South’ - by appealing to the right to development (defined as programmed social change to improve the material well-being of a nation) as the precondition for a more secure, peaceful,
egalitarian, and just world. Notwithstanding the profundity of its mandate, the UN proved incapable of managing the West-East and North-South antagonisms. It is likely that the precariousness of the UN contributed to the decision on the part of the framers of the IBHR to embrace pragmatism over idealism - a choice that sowed the seeds of a compartmentalized vision of human rights.

Over time, the compartmentalization of human rights became more rigid - not least because it played into the interests of the US as the hegemonic power. As the Cold War intensified, the US opted not only to minimize its obligations under international law (e.g., by characterizing the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and other treaties as 'non-self-executing,' and hence inapplicable to US law), but also to favor first-generation civil and political rights over second-generation economic and social rights and third-generation group and cultural rights (Blau, Brunsma, Moncada, and Zimmer 2008). In short, the US took two fateful steps away from its initial embrace of human rights. First, it declared itself exempt from the dictates of the ICCPR and the ICESCR even though it had spearheaded the founding of the UN and promoted the thickening of international law - two interrelated gestures that had helped the fledgling hegemon to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of many states and segments of the world’s population. Second, the US paired its deepening ambivalence for the ICCPR with a growing aversion to the ICESCR - a treaty that came to be associated, whether rightly or wrongly, with the interests of the Soviet Union and the Third World.

Doubtless, the very existence of two distinct covenants, with different power-blocs and constituencies behind them, attests to the widespread acceptance of the separation between the ‘negative rights’ (i.e., protections from abuses by state and non-state actors) delineated in the ICCPR and the ‘positive rights’ (i.e., economic, social, and cultural entitlements guaranteed by the state) enumerated in the ICESCR. Subsequent research, policymaking, and advocacy in the area of human rights have served to calcify the dichotomy between the two documents. As a consequence, human rights educators - especially those operating in the orbit of the UN and its NGO collaborators - have unwittingly lent credence to a conception of human rights as a developmental process that begins with civil and political rights (including the freedoms of association, assembly, and
speech, the right to own property, due process of law, and the right to vote), continues with economic and social rights (including the rights to food, housing, unemployment insurance, a fair wage, and social security), and ends with group and cultural rights (including the rights to maintain indigenous life-ways, use the commons and waterways of a group’s ancestors, and speak a minority language). Nevertheless, human rights educators have, for the most part, been aware of the messy, uneven, and incomplete fashion in which human rights are ordinarily implemented ‘on the ground.’ Thus, in light of the social learning accumulated by recent mobilizations for human rights, the time is ripe for educators to move beyond the developmentalist reading of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Yet it remains crucial for educators to offer social scientific readings of the major documents in the human rights canon. While the practice of exegesis - or rigorous textual analysis - remains important, the illumination of the world-historical conditions under which the principal texts are drafted, disseminated, debated, enforced, and violated proves equally important to students.

What is the next step for human rights education? Invoking the principle of holism, educators may emphasize the intersections among different types of rights - whether considered civil and political, economic and social, or group and cultural - on the ground. Citing the principle of globalism, educators may highlight non-European precursors, interpretations, and modifications of the human rights canon. Drawing on the principle of historicism, educators may stress the need for historical specificity in analyzing rights-claims. Finally, educators may urge their students not only to consider such recently formulated rights bundles as longevity, the full development of the person, and peace, but also to create their own rights bundles. If human rights education is to be incorporated into programs in service-learning and civic engagement at the university level, it must provide students with techniques for ‘operationalizing’ rights bundles in their communities.

References


Websites


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