Military Neoliberalism: Endless War and Humanitarian Crisis in the Twenty-First Century

Michael Schwartz
Stony Brook State University

Received January 2011; Accepted August 2011

Abstract
This article seeks to understand the dynamics of twenty-first century military intervention by the United States and its allies. Based on an analysis of Bush and Obama administration policy documents, we note that these wars are new departures from previous interventions, calling on the military to undertake post-conflict reconstruction in ways that was previously left to indigenous government or to the civilian aspects of the occupation. This military-primary reconstruction is harnessed to ambitious neoliberal economics aimed at transforming the host country’s political economy. Utilizing the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions as case studies, the study analyzes the dynamics set in motion by this policy. The key processes are two concatenated cycles of military pacification and economic immiseration in discrete localities operating through varying paths of causation. Pacification by the military as well as subsequent military-primary introduction of neoliberal economic reform generates immiseration; locally based resistance. As well as ameliorating efforts aimed at reconstructing the old system subsequently generates repacification. Each iteration of the cycle deepens the humanitarian crisis, and assures new rounds of local and sometimes national resistance.

Keywords
War, Humanitarian Crisis, Social Movements, U.S. Foreign Policy, Neoliberalism

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the first comprehensive Obama Administration statement of U.S. military policy, articulated goals similar to those expressed in its Bush-era predecessor (NSC 2006). The preface of the NSS promised to extend U.S. influence ‘to more countries and capitals,’ in order to shape ‘an international order that can meet the challenges of our times.’ In the Middle East, the document promised to ‘pursue comprehensive engagement across the region’ (NSC 2010, p.ii,1,4).

The ambitions expressed in this document are familiar to those who listen even casually to the statements of intention by
political Washington. They are noteworthy only because the document expresses an aspect of military policy that is rarely the focus of scholarly analysis: its assumption that the military would play a central role in advancing U.S. influence while the shaping ‘international order,’ and in pursuing ‘comprehensive engagement’ in the Middle East.

This article will look at the nature of military involvement in U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century, in an attempt to understand the dynamics and impact of such a military-centered foreign policy, assessing its impact on the social and economic structure of the countries that become focal points in the effort to shape the ‘international order.’ This study considers the social, political, and economic processes set in motion by the (attempted) enactment of this policy in the Middle East, giving special emphasis to the imposition of neoliberal reform as a key component in this process; the impact of making the military the centerpiece of economic and social reform; and effect of these dynamics on the human rights of the target population.

PART I - THE SCHOLARLY CONTEXT OF MILITARY-CENTERED REFORM

The scholarly context for the set of policies that characterized U.S. foreign policy in the first decade of the twenty-first century—and articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy—can be found in the autonomous literatures addressing neoliberalism, military intervention, and human rights—all subjects that have been integrated under the larger rubric of globalization.

Beginning before the fall of the Soviet Union, but amplified afterwards, scholars have sought to understand various aspects of cross-border relationships as part of globalization. This work has often divided the subject into economic, cultural, and political dimensions, supplemented by more specialized areas that do not necessarily fit into these broader categories, such as electronic communication, transportation, and migration.

One of the weaknesses in the current globalization literature is a relative (but by no means complete) inattention to the connections that tie the various elements of globalization together—either through reciprocal causation or through the sinews of common origins. There

~191~

© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
has, instead, tended to be separate literatures attending to each of the
general phenomena, and distinct sub-literatures devoted to the more
specialized areas³.

This study attempts to add to the under-attended connecting
sinews among these dimensions of globalization, by focusing on three
specialized areas in the globalization nexus, but which I feel have
become connected in new ways in the twenty-first century, particularly
in recent U.S.-led military interventions exemplified by the invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq.

◊ The predominance of neoliberalism as the guiding ideology
and practice of economic globalization. The work in this
area has focused on the ways in which the
neoliberal policies of privatization, free trade, and
deregulation have been both consequences and
causes of the extension of multinational
corporations into the core of various countries
(most notably for our purposes in the global
south), and the impact of these changes on both
the international and local economies⁴.

◊ Military intervention, usually led by the United States, but
ordinarily involving a nexus of states, most often
including representation from the European Union.⁵ Most
scholars analyze these interventions under the
rubric of political globalization, with the military
action serving the classical Clausewitz
characterization of ‘politics by other means.’⁶

◊ Humanitarian crises, which have been an unfortunately
common occurrence in the last two decades.⁷ The work in
this area has often been fitted into the literature
on the human rights regimes, consisting of a
nexus of international legal instruments, United
Nations institutions, associated human rights
organizations, and human-rights oriented social
movements. Work in this area focuses mainly on
the origins of these crises in terms of the political

© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
dynamics that characterize the locality, and with assessing the efficacy of the international human rights regime in reversing human rights violations and redressing their consequences.\textsuperscript{8}

\textit{Neoliberal Dynamics and Military Intervention}

Even before neoliberalism had become the chosen (self) designation of the guiding economic principle underlying economic globalization, its essential elements had caught the attention of some scholars. Global Reach, the 1974 best seller by Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller (2004) identified the removal of tariff barriers, removal of government subsidies, the privatization of government enterprise, and the vast expansion of overseas investment by the metropolitan money markets as the enabling legislation for the penetration of multinational corporations into the economies of what was then called ‘the Third World’—countries unaligned with the U.S. or Soviet blocs. The scholarship since then has refined our understanding of the underlying political-economic dynamics that have driven this process, focusing analytic attention on the compulsions of late 20th century capitalism in determining its impulse and impact.\textsuperscript{9}

The work in this area has led to two relevant analyses of the changing relationships among politics, military intervention, and economics. One set of analyses have focused on what some recent scholars have designated the transnational capitalist class (TCC); arguing that neoliberal globalization has freed the TCC from the traditional constraints of state regulation.\textsuperscript{10} Bauman succinctly summarized the argument:

Due to the unqualified and unstoppable spread of free trade rules, and above all the free movement of capital and finances, the ‘economy’ is progressively exempt from political control; indeed the prime meaning conveyed by the term ‘economy’ is the area of the non-political (Bauman,1998:66).

Scholars embracing this tradition have thus expected that the flow of investment and the expansion of MNCs has been increasingly
unfettered by either state intervention, international treaties, and (especially) by the actions—including military policy—of host governments (Duffield, 2001:47f).

A second thrust has looked at the opposite relationship—the ability of the TCC to influence various governments—or key elements of government—to advance its interest. This second analytic thrust has also received considerable attention, pointing toward a variety of mechanisms that pressure the various capitalist states to act on behalf of the TCC. One focal point of this work has been the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions—International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—usually working through trade agreements or structural adjustment loans. These vectors of power and influence typically find expression in altered government policies, most often through privatization of state-owned enterprises, lowering of trade barriers, and/or elimination of state subsidies to domestic industries or citizens, all of which facilitate the penetration of local economies by MNCs and/or international finance. Many analysts see the work of the Bretton Woods institutions as extensions of a loose grouping of governments, dominated by the United States and populated by several of the G20 largest economies (Smith 2005; Harvey 2005; Harris 2011; ), and that each of the G20 states—especially the U.S. government—acts on behalf of the TCC, as David Harvey argues at length (2003). Bauman, again, succinctly summarized this connection: ‘the nation-states turn more and more into the executors and plenipotentiaries of forces which they have no hope of controlling politically’ (Bauman, 1998:65). Subcommandante Marcos of the Zapatista movement in Mexico articulated an almost identical conclusion in his analysis of neoliberal globalization: ‘Where they were once in command of their economies, the nation states (and their governments) are commanded—or rather telecommanded—by the same basic logic of financial power’ (Marcos, 1997).

Bauman (1998), in elaborating this viewpoint, traces the origins of modern military interventionism to the Cold War, which, he believes, provided a framework for the military activities of the Western and Soviet blocs in the post World War II period, with each block establishing a ‘meta-sovereignty’ that allowed for ‘competition between groups of states, rather than between the states
themselves’ (1998:63). This meta-sovereignty, like its single-state predecessor, was ‘perched on the ‘tripod’ of military, economic, and cultural sovereignties’ (1998:61). Military action, then remained fully embedded in the larger political enterprise, a fundamental tool for imposing policy both internally (within countries) and externally (but within the two contending blocs). There were also occasional, spectacular, instances (e.g., Korea, Vietnam) involving areas under contention between the blocs. The rhetoric and diplomacy that surrounded these actions—internal to the blocs or in disputed realms—rested on the logic of Realpolitik (Finnemore 2003; Valentino et al. 2004). All these military moments thus constituted, in the analyses of scholars, Clausewitzian ‘politics by other means.’

The post Soviet era, as Martin Shaw (2001; 2005) has argued, was marked by the survival of the Western bloc along with its the propensity for armed intervention (e.g., Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, etc). In Shaw’s rendering, the U.S. military has become the dominant element in a supra-state military, in which most interventions involve the European Union, NATO, and/or Japan, collected together in what he calls the ‘Western State’ (or ‘the West’). As the confrontation with the Soviet Union faded into the rear-view mirror, the Realpolitik rationale also faded, with the ‘military institutions’ that compose this multinational army defined ‘as peacekeepers and agents of humanitarian assistance or, more radically, peacemakers, world police forces or … war-managers’ (2005:15). In Shaw’s view, and that of many other analysts, the role of the military in the globalized world continues to be an extension of diplomacy and international relations, an aspect of political globalization.12

My concern is with a particular subset of this literature that understands many of these interventions as extensions of neoliberal economic globalization. This understanding finds expression in the analyses that see the recent wars, especially the invasion of Iraq, as efforts to extend neoliberal policies into new political domains.13 David Harvey, who called the invasion of Iraq an attempt at ‘violent imposition of neo-liberalism’, expressed this viewpoint succinctly (2003:216). The draconian measures undertaken by L. Paul Bremer, almost immediately after his ascension to leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, were attempts, in Harvey’s interpretation, to ‘do by main force what the U.S. has been trying to
do globally for the previous 30 years.\textsuperscript{14}

Immanuel Wallerstein adds texture to this argument by analyzing the war as having broader significance than the simple imposition of neoliberalism in Iraq, seeing it instead as an attempt to halt the political and economic decline of the United States with a ‘demonstration’ war (2003).

Katharine Bjork (2010) developed this logic more fully, labeling the war in Iraq as a ‘punitive war.’ In reviewing U.S. interventions during the twentieth and twenty-first century, Bjork defined punitive wars as an effort to extend sovereignty into previously independent (or non-compliant) regions.

The underlying objective of punitive wars is to compel the abandonment of rival sovereignty claims and to prepare the way for securing the allegiance or just the capitulation of populations subjected to punitive actions; and to prepare the way for a thoroughgoing imposition of a more comprehensive colonial order. (Bjork 2010)

Such wars are therefore undertaken in ‘situations where not only military control is in question, but more fundamentally the moral or cultural claims on which sovereignty is premised are at issue.’

In Bjork’s analysis, such wars utilize what she calls ‘demonstrative or exemplary violence,’ as in the case of the ‘Shock and Awe’ campaign in Iraq. This sort of punitive strategy involves ‘targeting whole communities and ignoring distinctions between combatants and civilians,’ and is justified as an effort ‘to discipline, to impose order, to ‘pacify’, or even as tutelary, ‘to teach a lesson.’ Harlan Ullman, the military theorist who developed ‘shock and awe,’ offered a similar interpretation by first posing, then answering, his own rhetorical question in a British Guardian interview: ‘How do you influence the will and perception of the enemy, to get them to behave how you want them to? So you focus on things that collapse their ability to resist’ (Burkeman, 2003).

To illustrate this strategic orientation in the Iraq war as a whole, Bjork quotes then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s justification for the brutality of the U.S. assault on the insurgent city of
Falluja: ‘We’ve got to smash somebody’s ass quickly….There has to be a total victory somewhere. We must have a brute demonstration of power.’

This ‘demonstration element’ as critical to punitive war draws the analysis back to the globalized neoliberal project. Toby Dodge, in three illuminating articles detailing the logic that informed the invasion of Iraq, argues that this ‘demonstration’ element applied beyond Iraq to the Middle East as a whole. The on-the-ground military dimension of the U.S.-led campaign aimed at breaking down ‘the comparative autonomy from neo-liberal policy’ among Middle East countries:

The autonomy built up by the Baathist regime over 35 years of rule allowed it to defy the institutions of the international community and resist the application of 13 years of coercive diplomacy. Conversely, if it could be removed, if the full force of US military might could be displayed in one of the most important states in the region, then the rest of the Arab regimes could be made to submit fully to US hegemony. (Dodge, 2006:466-7)

This thread of analysis, which originates in the consideration of neoliberalism as an expression of the economic stance of the newly ascendant transnational capitalist class, and the framework within which post-Soviet U.S. foreign policy (and that of its allies) developed, leads to framing the military intervention in Iraq—and other recent interventions incorporating on-the-ground kinetic military operations—as part of the nexus of neoliberal reform. Dodge’s synthesis of punitive war into the tool box for ‘opening’ otherwise resistant economies to multinational trade and capital investment constitutes an analytic finishing touch for this thread of analysis.

These analyses, bringing neoliberal reform into the full purview of military goals, provide a dynamic explanation for the overarching ideology expressed in the National Security Strategy enunciated by Presidents Bush and Obama. At the same time, it stays within the boundaries of previous analyses, which view of military
action as extension of politics. The military role is to overthrow a sitting government and enable the establishment of a more congenial regime that could or would enact neoliberal economic reforms, among many others. In Dodge’s analysis—and that of others sharing his orientation—the military’s role remains one of ‘politics by other means.’ I will argue later that this role expanded during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to include a more direct role of the military in enacting neoliberal reform.

Human Rights and Military Intervention

Humanitarian motivations and justifications for military intervention emerged from the conjunction of post-Soviet politics and the half-century evolution of what scholars have come to designate as the global human rights regime (HRR). The founding of the United Nations in 1945 initiated an ongoing evolution in the international community’s posture toward protecting various populations from human rights violations within sovereign countries. Four institutional elements comprise the emergent human rights regime:

- **Treaties and other international instruments.** Starting with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (passed in 1948), the legal skeleton of the human rights regime now consists of a ‘vast number of international human rights instruments’ aimed at general or specific rights, sponsored by the United Nations and by regional and other groupings of governments (Buergenthal 1997:708; Kuperman 2009a).

- **The UN system.** The establishment of dedicated human rights agencies within and related to the UN has proceeded apace during this period, aimed at monitoring rights enforcement and mobilizing against violations. These include generalist bodies such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and a multitude of specialist agencies—including both venerable organizations such as UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund) and the...
ILO (International Labor Organization), and recent additions such as UN Women (Donnelly 1986; Mingst and Karns 2007; UN Women 2011).

Humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs have come to play a critical role in delivering ameliorative services to human rights victims, particularly in crisis areas (including work often characterized as reconstruction). While important NGOs, for example the International Committee of the Red Cross, predated the UN Charter, many nodes in this ever-growing network, including now familiar agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) and Amnesty International, have matured in conjunction with the legal and agency infrastructure of the HRR (Mingst and Karns 2007; Polman 2010; Duffield 2001).

Social movement organizations (SMOs). Increasingly international in scope, SMOs engage in direct action aimed at defending or extending human rights, usually targeting the policies and actions of governments and international formations, while invoking the legal and organizational infrastructure of the human rights regime. Groups focused on specific issues, such as Greenpeace, have formed into globalized groupings, most notably the World Social Forum.

In the early years of its development, the human rights regime typically focused on human rights violations associated with internecine violence—usually the repressive activities of a predatory regime, or the vicious (and often mutual) brutality of civil war. Initial UN humanitarian intervention fell into the category of peacekeeping: sustaining negotiated cease-fires by placing ‘peacekeepers’ between contending parties; tasking them with...
preventing renewed violence and human rights violation; and mobilizing (largely) NGOs to attend to the needs of the impacted civilians. Peacekeeping eventually evolved into ‘peacebuilding,’ in which UN personnel (or other international groupings) would insert themselves between warring parties in an attempt to create neutral territory and eventually dampen the violence. In both cases, the intervening parties—even if armed—did not engage in kinetic military action. Until the 1990s, then, humanitarian intervention, even when conducted by armed military personnel, was essentially non-violent. During this period, the high- and low-profile violent interventions—under the aegis of the UN or undertaken by the Western or Soviet blocs—were justified under the Realpolitik rubric (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Poland).20

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the evolving human rights regime migrated toward kinetic military intervention as a necessary tool for protecting human rights; this posture would eventually be codified as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), defined by the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001) in the following way:

The idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. (ICISS, 2001:viii).

By the early twenty-first century, when the ICISS codified the many aspects of R2P, kinetic military intervention under the banner of humanitarian goals had already become a feature of global life, Noam Chomsky (2002) had affixed the ironic label of ‘military humanism’ to this new form of war, and scholarly literature developed seeking to analyze its logic and consequences.

Most analysts attributed this shift away from non-violence to the failure of many previous peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, and to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which ‘broke the logjam in the UN Security Council and freed major powers to focus on more
altruistic objectives’ (Kuperman 2009b).21 Though Finnemore (2003) documented military humanism dating back to the nineteenth century, and counted the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Kurdish provinces of Iraq in 1991 by the U.S., Great Britain and France as the first instance under the HRR rubric,22 Donnelly (2006), pointed to ‘the dramatically tragic failure in Rwanda’ in 1994 as the impetus for the first full scale military humanism, in Kosovo in 1999:

As ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kosovo, an ethnically Albanian province of Serbia, seemed to be approaching all-out genocide, the United States, chastened by its failure in Rwanda, convinced NATO to embark on a three-month bombing campaign that ultimately led to international administrative control over Kosovo’ (Donnelly 2006:14; see also Kaldor 2006:139).

Based on case-by-case review of post-Soviet interventions, Finnemore concluded that the near-universal presence of human rights among the vocabulary of motives flowed from what she called ‘the coupling of security with human rights’:

States that abuse citizens in massive or systematic ways are now viewed as a security threat both because the flows of refugees and social tension that such policies create are destabilizing to neighbors, and because aggressive behavior internally is seen as an indicator of the capacity to behave aggressively externally. 23

Kaldor offered an exemplar of this logic in British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech on Kosovo to the Economic Club of Chicago: ‘We are all internationalist now whether we like it or not…. We cannot turn our back on conflicts and the violation of human rights in other countries if we still want to be secure’ (Blair 1999; quoted in Kaldor 2006:139-40).

The United States has been an animating, often predominant, force in many of these interventions, though virtually all were enacted
under banner of various transnational groupings (Shaw 2005:93f). Each has included in its vocabulary of motives forestalling or ending humanitarian crisis.24 Examples include:

◊ Military interventions sponsored by the UN, such as the ‘no fly zone’ in Libya in 2011, explicitly justified as necessary to prevent mass slaughter of peaceful demonstrators in the rebel center of Benghazi.

◊ Interventions by NATO, including the decade-long war and occupation in Afghanistan (later extended to Pakistan), justified at least in part as an effort to end the massive human rights violations of the Taliban regime.

◊ Military actions by ad hoc coalitions, most notably the U.S.-created ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invasion of Iraq, justified at least in part as intervention to definitively end the long history of human rights abuses practices by the Hussein regime and/or prevent his development and use of WMDs.

◊ Unilateral military action, including the United States drone and rocket attacks in Yemen and Pakistan, justified as controlling Al-Qaeda and thus preventing further attacks on innocent civilians.

This integration of humanitarianism into the vocabulary of motives for kinetic military action is nicely illustrated by President Bill Clinton’s justification for NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo: ‘If the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing’ (Kuperman 2009b:20).

A large portion of the analytic literature on military humanism (as well as the more restrained peacekeeping and peacebuilding) has sought to evaluate the efficacy of these attacks in abating or preventing humanitarian violations and crisis.25 In attending to this
question, the work in this area tends to define success—for both military and non-violent forms of intervention—in terms of the abatement of existing human rights problems. Most often, this leads to a focus on whether the intervention ends existing hostilities or preserves a fragile peace, and therefore eliminates the attendant human rights crises (such as ethnic cleansing or mass displacement). For example, the no-fly zone imposed over the Kurdish areas in Iraq in 1991 could be judged a success because the threatened ethnic cleansing there did not take place. In Afghanistan in 2001, the overthrow of the Taliban could be judged a success because it (temporarily) restored a series of human rights for women.

Recently this focus has been broadened to include the possibility of collateral or unintentional negative impacts on the target society. In an important series of studies, Alan Kuperman has pointed to what he called ‘perverse unintended consequences,’ in which action taken under the rubric of R2P ‘sometimes contributes to the tragedies that it intends to prevent’ (2009b:19,22). Kuperman points particularly to the ‘moral hazard’ of military (or non-violent) intervention that protects insurgents in civil wars, since it can either ‘[prolong] war and the resulting human suffering,’ or ‘[foster] rebellion by lowering its expected cost’ (Kuperman 2009a:342; 2009b:22). Kuperman’s argument thus asserts an indirect and unintentional exacerbation of human rights violations, since the perpetrator is the insurgency, rather than the intervening party.

While Kuperman and others evaluating the impact of HRR consider indirect and unintentional exacerbation of human rights violations by humanitarian intervention, a subarea of military sociology devoted to understanding the dynamics war in general and guerrilla war in particular analyze the direct impact of military interventions on civilian well-being, most particularly the propensity to target large numbers of civilians and thus create massive new violations of human rights. While this literature is not focused on interventions undertaken under the humanitarian rubric, the analyses (and examples) encompass them. Three important contributions to this literature offer quantitative evaluations of the prevalence of human rights violations by intervening powers. Alexander Downes reported that one-third of interstate wars have included what he calls ‘civilian victimization,’ defined as ‘a wartime strategy that targets and
Ivan Arreguin-Toft, found that about a fifth of all guerrilla wars fought since 1950 involved ‘barbarism,’ defined as ‘systematic violation of the laws of war,’ typically ‘depredations against noncombatants (viz., rape, murder, and torture).’ Benjamin Valentino and his colleagues documented ‘the intentional killing of large numbers of civilians’ as a common feature of state action against guerrilla movements, concluding that a fifth of the guerrilla wars since 1945 resulted in more than 50,000 non-combatant deaths (2004:377,397). Though these studies lack methodological consistency they nevertheless document the frequency of human rights violations as direct and deliberate consequence of interstate war, and especially those involving guerrilla insurgencies, whether or not the intervention is (partially or wholly) animated by human rights considerations.

This consideration is, however, raised by Kate Nash (2011); pointing to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo as instances in which the intervening countries themselves committed ‘human rights abuses’ in violation of ‘wide-ranging international law’ in the process of attempting to deter, dislodge, or overthrow an entrenched government. In these (and other) instances, Nash points to the failure of the human rights regime to restrain the intervening powers: ‘In large part [these violations are] due to the way wealthy and influential states and IGOs [International Government Organizations] co-operate with rather than condemn’ these actions’ (Nash, 2011).

Finnemore raises yet another dimension of the impact of humanitarian intervention on the host society, one fraught with the possibility of fresh human rights abuses. She points to a unique aspect of these interventions, flowing from the necessity of pushing well beyond the ‘stopping killing’ tasks of pre-Soviet interventions with humanitarian components. Humanitarian interventions must undertake ‘nation building’ designed to prevent a renewal of the security-threatening human rights abuses in the host countries:

Intervention in these places now occurs not simply with the aim of stopping killing, ... but instead has the mission of reconstructing entire states and society in ways that did not occur in...
previous periods of history. Interventions in failed states are no longer simply military affairs in which killers are disarmed and, if necessary, replaced in government by a new set of rulers. These interventions now involve a wide range of nonmilitary components involving reconstruction and social services, mostly provided by international organizations, aimed at overhauling war-torn society and remaking them in accordance with the normative preferred liberal democratic model. (2003:136)

Without naming it, Finnemore is gesturing at the involvement of the full human rights regime in such interventions, and appreciates that such efforts are fraught with the possibility of failure: ‘Simply handing over the reins of government to a new group is relatively easy, and intervenors have been doing this for centuries. Insuring broad social reorganization is much harder.’

Astri Suhrke (2007; 2008) analyzes and illustrates negative human rights consequences that can emanate from such an encompassing endeavor. Focusing on the period following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001, Suhrke reaches this conclusion:

The conflation of post-war reconstruction with a broader agenda of development and modernization has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social change. Simultaneously the prominent foreign role in the undertaking has increasingly had negative effects. As a result, the entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the problems caused by the growing insurgency (2007:1291-2).

In Surhke’s analysis, these ‘severe contradictions’ produce ‘destructive forms of development,’ flowing mainly from an effort to engineer ‘a near total overhaul of the country’s polity, economy and
society,’ and ultimately becoming key causal factors in, among other human rights problems, the displacement of tens of thousands of Afghans. (2007:1293,1299).

Surhke’s analysis presses beyond Finnemore’s cautionary overarching insight into the social and economic scope of humanitarian intervention; she locates the key problems in Afghanistan in the concatenation of human rights intervention and neoliberal economic reform (see also Tirman 2011:272-6). With the military a central actor in engineering all these transformations, human rights crises become a product of the process.

Taken together, we see the unfinished outlines of a convergence between the literature on neoliberal globalization and the studies of the globalized human rights regime. Both trace an evolution in policy that migrated toward military intervention as a key vehicle for vast institutional, cultural and economic changes in countries which are deemed to be outside either the realm of neoliberal economic globalization or the norms of the human rights regime. At the same time, both literatures posit strong tendencies for military intervention to degrade both human rights and economic health, rather than provide a foundation for upgrading social and economic prosperity. This study seeks to give more precision to these relationships, taking into account the complex processes operating in these situations.

PART II - UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN THE TIME OF OBAMA

We begin by considering the articulated policy of the United States, as expressed by the National Security Strategy quoted above, and other official documents. We will find a tight fit between the literature on military intervention and the explicit goals of the U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan, and—more generally—in the Middle East as a whole.

The Military as a Political-Economic Weapon

In April of 2009, General David Petraeus, the newly appointed leader of U.S. military in the Middle East, delivered his regularly scheduled and routine testimony to the Armed Services committees of both the House and Senate (Petraeus 2009). The report
was nevertheless noteworthy because it was the first such statement of policy by a high-ranking official of the newly installed administration of President Barack Hussein Obama. Its routine-ship allowed the public to discern key elements and motives of U.S. foreign policy that were unaltered by the change in chief executives. In this respect, it presaged the substance of Obama’s then-pending National Security Strategy quoted above.

Petraeus began his presentation by describing the ‘area of responsibility’ (AOR) for his command, officially known as the United States Central Command (CENTCOM):

*The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and distinct regions. Stretching across more than 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries, the AOR contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz…. The CENTCOM AOR encompasses the world’s most energy-rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together accounting for at least 64 percent of the world’s petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil production, and 46 percent of its natural gas reserves (Petraeus 2009, emphasis added).*

What might be surprising in this introductory paragraph was that Petraeus did not choose to describe his AOR in terms of the military challenges that it presented. He did not choose to introduce this region as an epicenter of violent conflict for the past five decades and—for many years—called ‘the arc of instability’ by U.S. government and military officials; nor did he choose to introduce it as the focal point of the ‘war on terror’ initiated in 2001 by the George W. Bush administration; and he did not choose to describe it as the prime source of safe havens from which ‘Islamic extremists’ could launch attacks on the U.S. and its allies.

Instead, he chose to introduce his AOR in terms of its economic and commercial role in the globalized world. The emphasis in Petraeus’ characterization of his AOR was the region’s mineral
wealth (as the ‘the world’s most energy-rich region’); and its commercial importance (since it contained ’vital transportation and trade routes,’ including ’strategic maritime choke points.’). That is, Petraeus’ altogether routine presentation treated the marriage of military and economic concerns as altogether routine; and he designated the U.S. military as an instrument for protecting the interests of dominant economic forces in the globalized economy.

It is the intimacy of this military-economic marriage that extends the role of the military beyond its traditional position as ‘politics by other means.’ The scholarship reviewed above conceptualizes military intervention—even when its intention contains an economic component—as focused on either changing governments or forcing changes in government policy. In the various scholarly perspectives—and in the reality of the twentieth century—economic goals pursued by military means were expected to be fulfilled by a two-step process: military action impacts on the nature of government and its policies, and then the altered government policies enact a new economic reality. The imagery in Petraeus’ presentation (and in predecessor and subsequent twenty-first century documents) implies—in addition to traditional coercion of state policy—direct action by the U.S. military to accomplish economic objectives—for example to prevent blockage of ’strategic maritime choke points’

A more vivid expression of this marriage of military and economic concerns was contained in the June 2010 reports from Afghanistan that scientific surveys had documented the presence of approximately one trillion dollars in accessible mineral wealth (Risen 2010; Peter 2010). Since this discovery had occurred several years earlier, journalists began querying the timing of the announcement, concluding that the late announcement was aimed at reversing the declining support for the war there. As BBC analyst Jill McGivering put it: ‘at a time of growing despair about Afghanistan and its government, the portrayal of the country as a potential goldmine could help to bolster international resolve and paint the country as a prize worth fighting for.’ (Quoted in Peter 2010; see also Lobe 2010b)

This characterization of Afghanistan was expressive of the underlying logic that characterizes U.S. policy in general, and the goals of the Centcom command in particular: that the capture, control, and
extraction of mineral and other economic resources—and making them available to the globalized economy—were legitimate, even routine, military objectives. Indeed, the presence of such mineral resources should be (and hopefully would be) a justification for continued and perhaps amplified military action aimed at integrating Afghan resources into the globalized economy. (Though the BBC report did not make it clear, the projected military role in developing these natural resources extended well beyond the traditional role of influencing Afghan government policy.)

The Protection of U.S. Influence

In his presentation, General Petraeus did eventually mention the more traditional military challenges that one might have expected to be the centerpiece of his description of his command, but even in this context, he reiterated this military marriage to political economy. For example, he began his brief review of the ‘Most Significant Threats to US Interests,’ with this passage:

The most serious threats to the United States, its allies, and its interests in the CENTCOM AOR lie at the nexus of transnational extremists, hostile states, and weapons of mass destruction. Across the AOR, Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies are fueling insurgency to reduce US influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and economic order. (2009:7)

In this passage, while mentioning Al Qaeda, transnational extremists, and hostile states, Petraeus did not emphasize the use of these ‘hostile states’ as safe havens; he did not mention their use by ‘transnational extremists’ as a resource for attacking the United States or its allies. In fact, the entire 10,000 word presentation to Congress made no mention of the threat of such attacks.

Instead, Petraeus emphasized the possibility that a combination of Al Qaeda, hostile states and WMDs could ‘reduce U.S. influence’ in the region and/or ‘destabilize the existing political, social and economic order.’ This emphasis fit nicely with his initial description of his AOR, in which he had neglected to express concern
about preventing attacks on the U.S. or its allies, emphasizing instead the importance of maintaining access to the 'vital transportation and trade routes' in the 'world’s most energy-rich region.'

**Regional Ambitions**

In addition to these defensive measures aimed at protecting the status quo, Petraeus also outlined the more expansive positive goals that his command would pursue, evoking the ambition of integrating the countries in his AOR into what he called a ‘network of cooperation,’ utilizing a ‘whole of government approach that fully integrates our military and non-military efforts and those of our allies and partners’ (2009:13-14). He summarized these ambitions thusly:

A model characterized by a focus on common interests, inclusivity, and capacity-building can best advance security and stability in the region. This **network of cooperation** is both effective and sustainable because it creates synergies and, as it grows, strengthens relationships. Each **cooperative endeavor** is a link connecting countries in the region, and each adds to the **collective strength of the network**. The mechanisms put in place to coordinate efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, or littoral security, can often be leveraged to generate action in other areas, **such as a rapid response to a major oil spill in the Gulf or in the aftermath of a typhoon or earthquake**. Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation in a set of issues can serve as an **opening for engagement on other issues**, thereby promoting **greater interdependence**. As a result, a growing network not only works to improve interoperability and overall effectiveness in providing security; it also builds trust and confidence among neighbors and partners.  

---

© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
While this was certainly a mundane recitation of familiar nostrums about the Middle East, its familiarity underscores the degree to which Washington policy rhetoric was infused with an assumption that the United States would be active in the daily life of the region. Unlike the typical scholarly vision of military intervention yielding political change and prompt withdrawal, Petraeus’ reference to a ‘network of cooperation’ assumed the United States—and the U.S. military—as an ongoing actor in the region. His promise of a ‘rapid response to a major oil spill … or a typhoon or earthquake,’ assumed activities far from narrow military concerns; and his expectation that ‘cooperation in a set of issues can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues’ assumed an enduring broad based involvement of the military in diverse aspects of Middle Eastern society. 37

Transforming the Middle East

Petraeus was not saying anything new or controversial. These visions and ambitions for the United States as a primary and permanent player in the ongoing political and economic life of the region had been an evolving aspect of Washington’s foreign policy even before the end of the Cold War.38 What Petraeus’ testimony articulated was a new and more central role for kinetic military action in pursuit of these goals, an innovation of the Bush Administration that would continue without pause or scrutiny into the Obama presidency. Petraeus was summarizing the more explicit expression of the same perspective, codified in President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy of 2006, the predecessor of Obama’s NSS four years later (NSC, 2006). That document included nine ‘essential tasks’ assigned to the United States military:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;

Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;

Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;

Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and

Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

Only three of these ‘essential tasks’ were military; the six others were broader—encompassing humanitarian, political, and economic ambitions. These broader concerns fit all-too-neatly into the trend toward military humanism codified by various scholars (see above, Part I). The promise, by a commanding general, to ‘champion aspirations for human dignity,’ by ‘opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy,’ and by expanding ‘free markets and free trade’ implied the centrality of military action in fostering encompassing social and economic transformation under the banner of humanitarianism. This vision fit neatly with scholarly viewpoints reviewed in Part I, including analysts of both humanitarian intervention and neoliberal expansion.

Particularly noteworthy was the emphasis on ‘opening [Middle East] societies’ to the ‘the circle of development,’ and thus igniting ‘a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.’ While in part a simple restatement of the U.S. government’s 40 year commitment to globalized neoliberalism, it also expressed the recent concatenation of military intervention with neoliberalization (see below).

In the 2006 document, the National Security Council dwelled on these economic goals, asserting them as fundamental to ‘extending
liberty and prosperity’ in the world as a whole. The three elements mentioned in this context were:

- Opening markets and integrating developing countries.
- Opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets to ensure energy independence.
- Reforming the International Financial System to ensure stability and growth.

For the Middle East, the goal of ‘opening markets’ was therefore fundamental: ‘We seek a Middle East of independent states, at peace with each other, and fully participating in an open global market of goods, services, and ideas.’

This familiar idea of ‘opening markets’ contains the assumption of economic transformation, especially when applied to the Middle East, where accomplishing such an ‘opening’ would require a profound and fundamental change in the way these countries conducted their economic, social and political life. What is notable here is that until 2001 successful (and unsuccessful) efforts at ‘opening markets’ and introducing the full range of neoliberal reforms had been undertaken through the economic globalization process—notably direct investment by the transnational capitalist class, leverage by the Bretton Woods institutions, and ample political pressure from core countries in the world system, most notably the United States. The 2006 NSS—and Petraeus’ 2009 testimony that embraced it—presented a substantially amplified role for the military in this neoliberal process, making the military the centerpiece of this economic process, at least in the Middle East.

In the body of his testimony, Petraeus spoke only briefly about each of the countries in the region under his command. His comments on Afghanistan lent substance to his more general concerns, assuring Congress that the military campaigns there would be ‘integrated into the broader plan to promote political and economic development’ (Petraeus 2009:24). As a prime example of how he would apply this broader plan, Petraeus pledged to develop a new agricultural regime to replace opium, the country’s largest cash crop.
which, in 2009 accounted for over 50% of the Afghan economy (McCoy 2010). Here is his description of this goal:

Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics trafficking, which has provided significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This drug money has been the ‘oxygen in the air’ that allows these groups to operate. With the recent extension of authority granted to US forces to conduct counter-narcotics operations, we are better able to work with the Afghan government more closely to eradicate illicit crops, shut down drug labs, and disrupt trafficking networks. To complement these efforts, we will also promote viable agricultural alternatives, build Afghan law enforcement capacity, and develop the infrastructure to help Afghan farmers get their products to market. (2009:23-4)

This program points to the fundamental contradiction pointed out by Surhke (2007; 2008) that is intrinsic to comingling military, economic, and political ambitions. The destruction of opium cultivation—presented by Petraeus as a new but essential part of the military campaign against the Taliban—would also deprive a plurality of Afghan farmers, merchants, and others of their chief source of income. He proposed to remedy this economic calamity by engineering an agricultural revolution. The troops under his command would construct, from the ground up, a new agricultural economy together with a political infrastructure to support it. In asserting these lofty goals, Petraeus was thus incorporating the neoliberal agenda into the military’s goals and responsibility, since this agricultural revolution would involve (in practice as well as theory—see below) opening these local areas to world markets (through purchase of supplies, sales of products, and—where relevant—foreign investment).

For Afghanistan, then, the U.S. role, as described by CENTCOM commander Petraeus, would be revolutionary, with U.S. personnel—military at first, civilian later—embedding themselves in local communities and transforming the lives of the residents. The
military would, in fact, ‘take a residential approach and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people, understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships.’ Petraeus succinctly summarized this transformative strategy as ‘building, not rebuilding.’ In enunciating the principle, he implicitly acknowledged the vast destruction of existing social and economic infrastructure (which would not be rebuilt), while promising a brand new social system (which would be built).

Even the neoliberal and military theorists who have appreciated the economic motives and the destructiveness of twenty-first century interventions have not appreciated the full scope of military ambitions. These theorists have looked at military action as targeted against states and their policies, with economic and social construction the responsibility of new or reformed governments. In the Bush and Obama administrations this historic division of labor has been superseded by transferring the agency of economic revolution from the indigenous state to the occupying army. At the same time, this broadened initiative fits neatly into the decades-long effort to spread neoliberalism to the farthest (and often most insulated) regions of the Middle East (and the world).41

A Robust Civilian Presence in Iraq

In discussing his mandate in Iraq, where the project was much further along than in Afghanistan, Petraeus focused on sustaining the U.S. presence there, thus revealing yet another dimension of the military-primacy policy that sets off twenty-first century intervention. While promising the orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops by the promised December 2011 deadline,42 he included a familiar caveat about the fragility of the situation:

Though the trends in Iraq have been largely positive, progress has been uneven, and the situation remains fragile and reversible. A return to violence remains an option for those who have set aside their arms. Enemy organizations, especially Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Iranian-backed Shi’a extremist groups, remain committed to narrow sectarian agendas and the expulsion of

For Petraeus, then, the fragility in Iraq lay in the possibility that ‘enemy organizations’ would accomplish ‘the expulsion of US influence.’ In light of this, the military took as its goal—even while it withdrew its troops—the preservation of U.S. influence in the country. This would include Iraq’s integration into the ‘network of cooperation’ that was his ultimate goal for the region, but also consolidating the partnership with Iraq inside the country, where influence would be maintained by an amplified civilian presence.

Even before the Petraeus testimony in summer of 2009, the commitment to a strong U.S. influence in Iraq was translated into practice by the increasingly high profile there of the U.S. State Department and other non-military U.S. agencies. The embassy compound, built to accommodate 1000 state department officials, and completed at a cost of over $600 million, was the largest embassy in world history when it opened in late 2008. (In 1900, when 300,000,000 people lived in the English colonial domain encompassing modern Indian, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the total British administrative force was considerably smaller.) This construction was, by itself, a clear signal that the Bush administration sought to sustain U.S. ‘influence’ long after the troops withdrew (Schwartz 2008:207; USBIA 1906).

The 2008 presidential election in the United States transferred to the Obama administration the task of defining and implementing the transition from a military occupation to what Obama himself would describe as a ‘robust civilian presence.’ The willingness to administer the Bush mandate was soon clear enough: by late summer 2009, the embassy staff had swelled to 1873 officials from 10 different U.S. government departments, far exceeding the residential or office capacity of the new embassy complex. This massive expansion generated considerable ambivalence about ‘rightsizing.’ A State Department investigation expressed both sides of the controversy, pointing out, on the one hand, that ‘Given the high priority placed on Iraq and the policy of the previous administration to encourage all relevant agencies to send employees to the embassy…many of the normal limits on staffing have not been imposed,’ while, on the other hand, concluding that ‘the time has come for a significant rightsizing.’
The recommendation to return to the original staffing levels would, the report averred, allow the Embassy ‘to carry out its mission in Iraq’ (quoted in Strobel 2009).

This mission, as defined by the Obama team, was not restricted to an advisory role to various agencies in the Iraqi government. Despite the NSS promise of a transition to ‘full Iraqi sovereignty and responsibility’, the progressively civilianized U.S. presence adopted instead a ‘hands on’ approach (NSC 2010:4). United States officials took the initiative in both developing and implementing the policies that would fulfill the administration’s promise to transform the country into a full participant in the ‘network of coordination’ envisaged in Petraeus’ testimony.

A centerpiece of this activist orientation was the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, described by Associated Press reporter Warren Strobel (2009) as ‘the prime U.S. tool for rebuilding civilian life in Iraq’s provinces.’ These teams were tasked with entering small or medium sized communities, assess their needs, recruit necessary resources and labor, and oversee the process to its successful conclusion. This work could include anything from job creation and sewage systems to police training and constructing a local government.

The military was expected to tightly coordinate with the PRTs, protect them as well as engage in the active work of the teams. In areas without PRTs, the military engaged in its own initiatives, aimed at establishing the foundation for integrating Iraqi society into the global system. In the spirit of what has become formally known as Counterinsurgency Warfare, CENTCOM troops in Iraq (and also Afghanistan) were instructed to ‘clear, hold, and build’ in the communities they entered. That is, after utilizing normal military means to oust insurgents from the community, they were expected to shift their work from mainly ‘kinetic’ activities (involving the use of lethal force) to ‘non-kinetic’ activities (Allam 2009). During the transition from kinetic to non-kinetic missions, the military relied increasingly on its Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which provided financing for ‘water, electrical or agricultural projects and other emergency needs’ (Morrison 2009). Utilizing this fund, the units would, often in cooperation with State Department PRT units, assess local needs and implement plans to address them.
Very frequently, U.S. contractors were hired to implement the local projects initiated by the PRTs or by the military. International Relief and Development, a Virginia-based non-profit, for example, received a $644 million contract, tasked with ‘paying Iraqis cash to do public works projects such as trash removal and ditch digging.’ (This program was later discontinued because it had drowned in a sea of corruption that led to meager public works, and because too many of the jobs were given to mythical employees instead of local residents (Dilanian 2009).) By summer of 2009, the number of contractors employed by U.S. agencies working out of the embassy had risen to 13,000 (Strobel 2009).

This multipronged approach to the ‘robust civilian presence’ fully expressed the long term perspective on the U.S. presence, which imagined and enacted the United States as a key agent in developing and then implementing plans for the future structure and functioning of Iraqi society, with the military—for the short and medium term—at the center of this nexus of institutions.

The emergent policy expressed by these commitments and actions involved ‘shared sovereignty,’ an innovative new policy proposed by Stephen Krasner, Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State from 2005 to 2007:

Shared sovereignty would be a promising addition to the available set of policy options. Shared-sovereignty entities are created by a voluntary agreement between recognized national political authorities and an external actor such as another state or a regional or international organization. Such arrangements can be limited to specific issue areas like monetary policy or the management of oil revenues (2005:70).45

Shared sovereignty became a third element in the projected role for the U.S. military (and the associated civilian agencies) in Iraq (and, subsequently, in Afghanistan): in partnership with the state department and other government and private agencies, the military was tasked with establishing a new kind of joint governance (with the newly installed client government) over various projects that would
work to dismantle destroyed or dysfunctional elements of the existing social and economic structure while constructing a new system designed to fit into neoliberal globalization.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Bundt, the Deputy Health Attaché to the US Embassy in Baghdad during 2009-2010, expressed this tripartite responsibility—dismantling the old structures, building a new structure, and sharing sovereignty—in his detailed plan for a new medical system in Iraq. Bundt worked ‘directly with the [Iraqi] Minister of Health on the first implemented health policy since Operation Iraqi Freedom began.’ The resulting document detailed ‘the challenges we face in planning, implementing, and sustaining a viable health care policy in Iraq’ (Bundt, 2010). In introducing his work, Bundt stated:

Following combat operations and phasing into stabilization operations, basic health care infrastructure and systems have often been either disrupted or degraded altogether. To address this situation, the U.S. Government requires a coordinated interagency approach to formulate a strategic health care plan. Incorporating all relevant players into this endeavor will promote sound organizational design, unity of effort, and a culture favorable to synchronization. This paper contains specific recommendations and advocates a renewed effort toward addressing them. The primary constructs under review are U.S. Government organization, leadership, and culture as they relate to a strategic health care policy. This approach will reduce redundant efforts, conserve resources, and augment the legitimacy of the new Government of Iraq while supporting U.S. national strategic aims.’

What is striking about this text was how it express the full range of new responsibilities shouldered by the U.S. military (and associated civilian agencies) in Iraq.
That the United States had taken the initiative to ‘formulate’ a plan for a new health care system in Iraq, and that this effort would ultimately incorporate ‘all relevant players,’ including a number of U.S. agencies and, at some point, the Iraqis themselves, is a perfect illustration of Krasner’s concept of shared sovereignty.46

Bundt’s comment that the pre-existing (and once very effective) medical system in Iraq had been ‘either disrupted or degraded altogether,’ signals the typical by-product (or goal) of intervention, resulting in the destruction of existing structures (in this case a free state-run-and-financed hospital system).

The newly designed system proposed by Bundt fit comfortably into the neoliberal framework, including a full measure of private enterprise and a very limited role for the Iraqi government and its ‘degraded’ state-run hospital system.

The assignment of Bundt as the key planner of this program (in partnership with the Iraqi Minister of Health) is symptomatic of the centrality of the military in creating the foundation for this new initiative in the health care sector, and pregnant with the expectation that the military would continue to play an essential role, even as it was expected to withdraw completely by the end of 2011.

This expectation of withdrawal, which was still in doubt in mid-summer 2011, presented considerable problems for U.S. planners in the medical and other areas in which shared sovereignty was expected to extend beyond December 2011, and in which a military presence was required. In Spring of 2010, the U.S. State Department, slated to be handed the primary role that the Defense Department
had played in the first eight years of the war, enunciated two strategies to manage this problem, if indeed the U.S. military did withdraw as scheduled.

First, the State Department requested substantial resources to fund a dramatic expansion of its own military force, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The Associated Press reported the request thusly:

The State Department says its diplomatic staff won't be safe after the American military leaves Iraq unless it has its own combat-ready protection force, a warning that underscores concerns about the Iraq army and police the U.S. has spent billions of dollars training and equipping.

Vehicles and aircraft used by the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security to protect personnel in other parts of the world are 'inadequate to the extreme security challenges in Iraq,' according to documents the State Department sent to the Pentagon in April. The bureau will need to 'duplicate the capabilities of the U.S. military' by December 2011, the documents say, when all American forces are scheduled to leave Iraq.

The State Department wants 24 of the Army's Black Hawk helicopters, 50 bomb-resistant vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers and high-tech surveillance systems, according to the documents, which were obtained by The Associated Press (Lardner 2010).

The long term perspective of the State Department expressed in these plans underscored the commitment not only to a pervasive U.S. influence throughout Iraqi society, but also that military personnel would be essential to the vast projects that the 1000 U.S. officials, the tens of thousands of U.S. based contractors, and the multitude of others (including some Iraqis) who would be employed
or involved in enacting their plans.\textsuperscript{47}

At this same moment, the State Department announced a second plan, to replace its PRTs with five ‘Enduring Presence Posts,’ a set of satellite compounds in various parts of the country, commanding the local programs, and therefore alleviating the pressure on the overcrowded embassy in Baghdad. Their plan was based on taking over the existing facilities and equipment used by the military (including, perhaps, their five ‘enduring’ military bases scheduled to be abandoned in December of 2011), since the alternative would be to develop ‘a massive new life support infrastructure throughout Iraq.’ These facilities would be protected by private security personnel, thus providing a second (mercenary) force to operate in place of the departing soldiers and marines (Lardner 2010; Ackerman 2011).

During its first 18 months in office, the Obama administration’s commitment to ongoing ‘influence’ in Iraq took shape as a powerful, resourceful presence ‘throughout Iraq,’ headquartered by the huge embassy in Baghdad, populated with ample administrators capable of overseeing the work of at least 10 federal agencies, to be supervised in the future by five ‘enduring presence posts’ judiciously placed to reach into the various regions of the country, and already or eventually extending into myriad small communities, middle-sized towns and larger cities, where U.S. government teams and their contractors were already or were expected be working on myriad projects relating to infrastructural development, including water, electricity, and construction, and reaching the into the daily lives of even small villages through small projects hiring locals to dig ditches and remove trash. This portrait, and the reality that U.S. policy sought to enact, assumed a pervasive and controlling U.S. presence in Iraq aimed at transforming the country, with various forms of armed forces (U.S. military, State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and private security firms) involved in myriad aspects of the operation.

The late Bush and early Obama administrations expressed the same intentions for local transformation throughout Afghanistan (Schwartz 2009; Ellsberg et al. 2010). These ambitions also made their appearance in the military intervention in Pakistan, where the United States established an ‘elaborate system that tracks the funds’ it was investing in ‘post military reconstruction—not only schools but [also]
enterprise infrastructure. The logic even extended to countries where no direct military intervention had occurred. In Jordan, for example, the Pentagon collaborated with King Abdullah in constructing a ‘state-of-the-art military and counterterrorism training facility’ that gave full expression to an intrusive U.S. military presence in the context of shared sovereignty. General Petraeus spoke at the opening ceremony, situating the center into the larger U.S. project of integrating the region, calling the facility ‘a center of excellence not only for doctrinal development and refinement of TTPs [technology, tactics and procedures], but for strengthening the regional security network emerging in this area’ (Turse 2010).

We see, then, that the military responsibilities and goals expressed in General Petraeus’ testimony in Congress, in the National Security Strategies filed by the Bush and Obama administrations, and by the various plans enunciated by both the Defense and State Departments converged into the strategic orientation sketched out by recent scholarship, augmented by military primacy in non-kinetic reconstruction.

◊ The interventions, while expressing ample quanta of Realpolitik intentions, also invoked a full measure of humanitarian motives.

◊ Beyond the traditional military task of replacing the government of the target societies, these interventions sought an encompassing social and economic transformation aimed at integrating these countries into the neoliberalized global economy and establishing a Western-style electoral system. These reforms would act as a guarantee against the restoration of the internal pathologies that had generated humanitarian crisis and animated the intervention.

◊ This transformation involved dismantling dysfunctional systems within existing society, building replacement systems integrated into the globalized political, economic and cultural system,
and developing a system of shared sovereignty involving a long term U.S. presence as an active partner in the key political-economic structures in the host society.

◊ The U.S. military would play a primary role in the initial (mainly political) actions that eliminated the old system and its constituent (political, economic, cultural) structures, but also take a leading role in both the building of the new system, and in (at least the initial stages) of shared sovereignty.

This nexus of responsibilities projected the military into a new role, one that was not part of earlier military interventions over the decades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and beyond the portraits developed either by theorists of neoliberalism or analysts of the changing profile of military action. It was the expansion of military responsibilities that set in motion a host of processes that had profound impact on-the-ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, that would create negative lock-in effects on the welfare of their citizens, and that would presage similar consequences in other countries subject to ambitious twenty-first century intervention.

PART III - INVASION, TRANSFORMATION, AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

At its most general level, the policy enunciated by General David Petraeus involved a marriage of military means with transformative goals, to be applied to his area of responsibility as a whole, and to Iraq and Afghanistan specifically. The implementation of this mission required in Iraq and Afghanistan (and might well require elsewhere) an intrusive—first military, then civilian—presence that would be the enabling process for fully implementing the policy. What could not be visible—at least ahead of time—was its effect on the daily lives of Iraqis, Afghans, and other host populations as the impact of this attempted military-primary transformation matured.

As the Obama administration entered office, eight years after the invasion of Afghanistan and six years after the invasion of Iraq, the on-the-ground impact had become evident (particularly in Iraq,
which had been the focal point of Bush administration policy) and the causal relationships between the policy and its consequences clarified. Stated briefly, the combination of intervention with transformation, engineered by kinetic military force, sets in motion a downward spiral of pacification campaigns and cycles of immiseration for the host population, leading to both endless war and eventual humanitarian crisis. This section seeks to understand how this operates as a general pattern, and in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. Discussed in the following stages:

- **Structural Adjustment in the Middle East.** We begin with a review of the government reform instituted by the U.S.-led occupations, stressing particularly the neoliberal policies (at least partially) implemented at the national level after the creation of the new regimes.

- **Conjoining Military Occupation and Structural Adjustment: The Vicious Cycle of Pacification.** We then consider the unique pattern in the Middle East, in which the military was the primary vehicle for structural adjustment (in the absence of a viable indigenous government). This produces a vicious cycle of pacification.

- **The Vicious Cycle of Pacification: How the Cycle of Violence Produces a Cycle of Immiseration.** From this we identify a set of processes that produce cycles of escalating resistance and more ferocious pacification campaigns. Embedded in the cycle of violence is another cycle in which reconstruction projects initiated after pacification contribute to immiseration and help to trigger the next military intervention, which produces a new round of amplified immiseration.

Having analyzed this set of primary dynamics, we move the lens of analysis from the kinetic military dynamics to the two other...
legs of the pacification cycle. In Part IV, we focus on the cycle of immiseration that operates within the larger pacification cycle, seeking to trace its implications for both human welfare and its role in generating never-ending activism at local levels. In Part V, we look at the inevitability of pulsing resistance to the occupation and to its neoliberal agenda; and the potential of this resistance to alter (or deepen) the pacification/immiseration cycle.

Structural Adjustment in the Middle East

In the first instance, the vision of regional integration enunciated by Petraeus and fundamental to U.S. policy in the Middle East, relied on opening the local economies to the globalized economy led by the transnational capitalist class. These goals therefore depended on an economic revolution in the target countries. The process of ‘opening up’ Middle Eastern economies implied, at a minimum, allowing relatively unfettered investment by the multinational corporations that constituted the core of the globalized economy. But this sort of access required dismantling substantial portions of the host economy. Government-owned, government subsidized, or tariff protected enterprises within the host country constituted an insurmountable barrier to investment by transnational financial and industrial corporations, and penetration by imported products. Hence, this nexus of protection must be dismantled. Depending on the size and centrality of such protected enterprises, this dismantling could dramatically disrupt the economy as whole, as their employees lost their jobs, while trading partners with these enterprises experienced contraction or closure. In Iraq, with state-owned enterprises constituting 35% of the economy, the disruption was destined to be apocalyptic (Klein 2004, 2007; Schwartz 2008).

In addition to the elimination of competition from government-protected enterprises, the success of foreign capital and products in the local markets also depended on their ability to attract labor and customers. Insofar as the government provided key services at non-market prices or paid its employees wages that exceeded the standards set by international investors, it would deprive the globalized economy of the needed labor and customers. In this context, then, a favorable investment climate required carefully
circumscribed government services and employment.

These broad and potentially momentous changes in the functioning of the domestic economy necessarily lead to a broader set of social and political disruptions. The rising (perhaps exploding) unemployment and the declining (perhaps collapsing) public services potentially create calamities among those directly effected, quite probably a considerable proportion of the population. The reactions of those affected, depending on their numbers and location in the system, then ripple or rip through the fabric of society. Here again, Iraq suffered particularly acute versions of these processes (see below).

This nexus of reforms undertaken by the U.S. occupation in Iraq and less visibly in Afghanistan did not differ in substance from the traditional demands made by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund when they undertook 'structural adjustment' in implementing rescue loans for troubled economies of the global south, beginning in the mid-1970s. The goal of 'opening' articulated by the Bush and Obama administrations, constituted the twenty-first century version of structural adjustment, applied to Middle Eastern economies that had, despite the considerable pressure in the previous century, continued to control their internal markets through various state-centered initiatives. Summarizing this trend, Toby Dodge observed: 'the state-driven development strategies pursued throughout the region from the 1950s onwards were directly and indirectly sheltered from the dynamics of the global economy' (2006:462).

What distinguished the process of economic 'opening' in Iraq and Afghanistan from the process of structural adjustment in the previous century was the use of military power as the engine of change. In Chile, Argentina, Russia and numerous other countries where IMF/World Bank structural adjustment was undertaken (with mixed results), the leverage applied to effect the transformation was the promise of rescue loans to end an economic crisis; with the indigenous government, co-opted and coerced by the financial leverage into becoming the instrument of implementation. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the economic transformation could only be initiated once an indigenous regime constructed upon a foundation of state control (of the economy and much else) was dismantled, leaving the
newly established occupation (and its newly established client regime) with the responsibility for enacting the needed reforms. The main implementation tool was therefore the victorious military, the only institution with a ready-to-function organization capable of reaching into the various geographic, social, and economic regions.

Conjoining Military Occupation and Structural Adjustment

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, there was no instant rebellion against the occupation, and therefore no immediate call for extensive kinetic operations. On the contrary, the initial reaction among most ordinary citizens to the overthrow of unpopular and oppressive governments was ambivalent at worst, and enthusiastic in at least a substantial minority (WPO, 2006; BBC, 2007). The relative lack of wholesale destruction during the toppling of the incumbent regimes, which crumbled quickly under the pressure of the invaders, contributed to this modulated response, though the pre-invasion ‘shock and awe’ campaign in Iraq generated bitterness in the Baghdad population subjected to it (Shaw, 2005:115). In Iraq, in the first months after the fall of Saddamist regime, there were fewer than ten violent attacks per day on the occupation military and administration (Brookings Institution, 2007).

The surge in protest and violence began somewhat later, when the dislocations associated with economic transformation reached a large number of local citizens. In Iraq, the surge began when the occupation regime set about dismantling the government under the banner of Debaathification—demobilizing the army and shuttering the vast majority of government owned, operated, or subsidized agencies and enterprises, sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers and employees home. This dismantling process eroded the quality of life of a large number of families suddenly deprived of their often middle class income and of the services that government agencies had provided. The secondary consequences of this drastic reduction deprived a huge number of enterprises of paying customers for all variety of goods and services, spreading immiseration through the country, and generating the first surge of active discontent. By mid-2004, as the immiseration took hold, insurgent attacks reached 50 per day and continued to rise, exceeding 100 per day a year later and approaching 200 by late 2006 (Brookings, 2007:7).
The architects of the economic transformation had expected passive acceptance of this initial immiseration. This prediction may have rested on the response to structural adjustment in many countries of the global south, where even widespread discontent—at least in its initial phases—was managed without major eruptions. In fact, the imposition of abrupt economic austerity through structural adjustment had acquired a piquant name—‘economic shock treatment’—suggesting that the force of the economic changes worked to shock those negatively impacted into immobility, in much the same way that ‘electro-shock’ treatment—passing an electric current through the patient’s brain—pacifies obstreperous mental patients (Klein, 2006, Ch. 1).

The key to the successful application of ‘economic shock treatment’ lay in its administration by an intact indigenous regime with a full array of responses, ranging from ferocious repression (e.g., Chile) to cooptation and conciliation (e.g., Argentina). The choice of responses and the ability to shift from one to another in light of circumstances reflected both the sovereignty of the regime—the acceptance by the population of its right to make policy choices and enact them—and its administrative viability—its capacity to implement and enforce decisions or laws all the way down to the level of small communities. In no small measure, this administrative sovereignty rested on and derived from the indigenous government’s ability to apprehend and understand the mood and intentions of the population in diverse communities around the country—in military jargon, reliable intelligence.

In the special context created by the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘economic shock treatment’ did not and could not work because the initial destruction of the indigenous government deprived the occupation of the necessary tool for managing both drastic change and the inevitable discontent. It is significant that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration specifically excluded an effort to organize coup d’états to replace existing rulers with leaders supportive of U.S. goals—and thus preserve the administrative structure (and power structure) of the predecessor regime. This path untaken reflected the (more than plausible) conviction that the state structures of these countries—though very different from each other—were incompatible with the transformative goals of the invasion. Both the
fundamentalist backbone of Taliban government in Afghanistan, and
the tightly controlled state-centered economy practiced by the
Saddamist regime were antithetical to goal of integrating these
countries into the globalized world of transnational capitalism.
Douglas Lovelace, director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the
U.S. Army War College, succinctly summarized this analysis just
before the invasion of Iraq, warning that the US would have to:

undertake to provide time, considerable
manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct
Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the
success of military operations will be ephemeral,
and the problems they were designed to eliminate
could return or be replaced by new and more
virulent difficulties. 53

In the larger context of the Middle East, this same logic could
be applied to virtually every other regime in the region.54

The Vicious Cycle of Pacification: How the Cycle of Violence Produces a Cycle of
Immiseration

What is left unanalyzed by the theorists of this new
transformational warfare—and by most scholars who study it—are
the on-the-ground dynamics set in motion by the marriage of military
primacy and neoliberal transformation.

When the military has no transformational responsibilities,
the battle to pacify the country proceeds on a community-by-
community basis in the regions where resistance arises. When
pacification includes economic and social transformation, however, a
self-replicating cycle of military conquest becomes an all-too-routine
pattern. In outline form, it works in the following way.

◊ The military conquers a locality, dismantles the
incumbent government and moves on to new
conquests. The violence of this attack leaves a
residue of anger.
The local area mobilizes itself to reconstruct the damaged social and economic structure, often also building violent and non-violent resistance to the occupation.

At least some of these rebuilt structures are contradictory to the transformative agenda of the occupation, while others might mount attacks against the occupation army or its domestic allies.

With only a military weapon, the occupation army returns, reconquers the community and forcibly dismantles the offending structures while hunting down insurgents, generating even greater anger and greater resistance.

If the occupation army departs, the cycle of reconstruction and reconquest recurs. If the army remains and initiates transformative reconstruction, ‘economic shock treatment’ generates a new round of resistance, non-violent or violent. As long as the army stays, even passivity is fraught with tension.

While the United States and its allies considered the initial annihilation of the predecessor governments in Iraq and Afghanistan a necessary pre-requisite for the transformative project, the inevitable result was the hasty construction of new regimes with the sketchiest administrative presence, even in the capital cities. In the hinterlands—excepting those few with a large military presence—the dissolution of central government left behind orphaned remnants of the deposed regime with no resources and little authority. This vacuum produced one of the key unanticipated consequences of military-led neoliberal transformation. Facing myriad problems—including fundamental survival issues—without the presence of incumbent governments capable of suppressing and channeling the discontent, local communities organized themselves. Into the breach flowed the quite-often-rich civil society based around...
churches and tribal structures, which in most cases had ambivalent relationships to both the recently ousted (and largely detested) regime and the newly formed (and so far useless) central government. In varying combinations, these groupings formed ad hoc local administrations with varying degrees of local legitimacy and viability, commanding varying degrees of compliance based on a varying mixture of consent and coercion. These local formations sought—with widely varying degrees of success—to reverse or ameliorate the rippling disruption of family and community life wrought by both the military campaigns and by the socio-economic transformations instituted by the occupation.57

While these responses varied widely from locality to locality, they were all rooted in the existing social and economic system and therefore contradictory or resistant to the economic and political transformations sponsored by the occupation. For the most part, therefore, they articulated and nurtured protest against the new regime. Across many localities, consistent patterns emerged, including the formation of local militias to institute a new law and order, the revival of the pre-existing local economy, attempts at restoration of public services, the expression of collective protest against unemployment and economic hardship, and—often, though not always—support for the perpetrators of disruptive or violent attacks against the occupation regime.

Without the services of a functioning and legitimate national government, the occupation would inevitably be required to rely on the military to respond to the challenges—whether they were violent or peaceful. It is important to contrast these responsibilities with those thrust upon the military when its job had been only to oust the sitting government. While the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions did at first involve a conventional war aimed at defeating a conventional army, conquering a capital city, and toppling a sitting government; its subsequent mission was drastically different from earlier ‘post combat’ duties.58

In previous wars conducted by the West in what is now called the Global South, post-combat rebuilding by local communities could often be supported and even facilitated by the occupation itself. With or without occupation collaboration, the human rights regime often mobilized global aid in support of these efforts. In the context of
social and economic transformation that characterizes twenty-first century Western warfare, these rebuilding projects often constituted a threat to the overarching mission, since much of this reconstruction would restore the (dangerous) institutions slated to be replaced.

In the context of Iraq and Afghanistan—each operating without a functioning government—the military was tasked with constraining or dismantling a civil-society-based movement advocating and enacting (at the local level) social and economic policies contrary to the goals of the occupation. The (armed or peaceful) activists pressing for these contrary goals were, moreover, often embedded in the local community as political, religious or tribal leaders. Assigning the army the task of responding to this broad spectrum of local activism guaranteed a kinetic response, aimed at ‘rooting out’ the activists who spearheaded it.

This ‘rooting out’ process thus was an organic (and perhaps inevitable) consequence of the logic of military conquest in service of neoliberal social transformation (Schwartz 2008). Virtually all variants of efforts to defeat embedded community resistance aim at decapitating the leadership and destroying the underlying personnel structure, a process that almost inevitably damages the physical infrastructure of the communities that house the resistance. In Iraq and Afghanistan, this strategy generated the by-now familiar imagery of U.S. soldiers bursting into homes in midnight raids aimed at surprising suspected insurgents, applying overwhelming fire-power against the least gesture of resistance, and launching rubble-creating air strikes when local residents/insurgents chose to stand and fight. This methodology—attacking the buildings that contain suspected combatants—not only produces extensive property damage, but also injures or kills large numbers of non-combatants who reside or are sheltered in the targeted district. During sustained battles, the local population and the community’s physical infrastructure may (inevitably) become targets in their own right, since their destruction or death deprives the enemy of needed resources to survive the siege—on the one hand, electricity, water, and roads provided by physical infrastructure; on the other hand, food, shelter and medical care from civilian supporters.

Eliminating the organizational personnel and leadership of the resistance, together with the destruction of physical infrastructure,
serves three functions in the minds of the architects of occupations designed to conquer and transform the invaded country. First, these battles provide the immediate benefit of killing or capturing hard-to-find and hard-to-eliminate enemy combatants (or activists) while debilitating the larger organization in which they operate. Second, military strategies that injure or destroy local political, economic or social systems—however immediately destructive—eliminate support for the old political-economy, clearing the way for the new regime. Finally, the local residents learn that there is a large price to pay for non-compliance to the new order and/or support of the insurgents, discouraging future resistance and/or future efforts to reconstruct the pre-occupation social and economic structure.

In practice, this strategy involves penetration of the offending locality with an overwhelming military force. Virtually all such operations are successful in taking control of the area, many with little actual combat. Even these relatively non-violent operations nevertheless generate bitterness and—perhaps more important—immiseration, since even the most peaceful process involves home invasions, forceful incarceration of suspects, and considerable property destruction as part of the search for combatants and weapons inside of homes and communities. Where actual fighting occurs—including in many instances the lethality of an aerial or artillery barrage—it adds substantially to the already degraded condition of the targeted community: destroying private and public buildings, further weakening or collapsing vulnerable electrical, sewage, and water systems, and injuring or killing many residents of the community. In all too many of these instances the battle becomes a siege in which entire neighborhoods or villages become targets; in these cases the destruction is definitive, rendering many homes or an entire community uninhabitable, with the surviving families decimated or destitute (Schwartz 2008).

These raids—with or without the ensuing battles—generate full-on anger among the residents. Those who flee the community and become displaced carry their anger with them. Once the army moves on to its next operation, those remaining attempt to restore their old regime and—often enough—begin a new round of protest and rebellion. At this point, the military faces the unsavory prospect of needing to reconquer a neighborhood, village, or even a city that it
had already pacified.

The migration of the occupation military from one ‘insurgent stronghold’ to another generates a potentially endless cycle of pacification, immiseration, resistance, pacification, and renewed (and often amplified) resistance. The initial fighting is itself the source of a variety of humanitarian issues. As the army moves on to its next target, the prostrate community organizes itself to repair the damage and build a resistance to what might be the next round of fighting, sometimes aided by NGOs and other elements in the human rights regime. These initial local responses often constitute direct or indirect challenges to the occupation, provoking new pacification efforts by the newly imposed military-primary regime, including, in too many cases, kinetic operations. These military operations then lead to further economic and social degradation, both as a byproduct of the confrontational violence and the attempt to destroy or dismantle the social infrastructure that fueled violent resistance and/or local efforts at reconstituting the social structure slated for elimination. The consequences are therefore a deeper immiseration—often leading to displacement—than the previous iteration of fighting, and—in most cases—a more ferocious anger, sometimes drifting into terrorism. If and when the occupation military moves on, the remaining residents undertake a new round of rebuilding efforts and frequently amplified rebellion; with the circle closing when this new round of local organization triggers another round of pacification.

An Example: Counterinsurgency in Marja and the Vicious Cycle of Pacification

The ascension of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency led to an assessment of military operations in Afghanistan, resulting in a surge strategy energized by a 30,000 soldier increase and aggressive new offensives in Taliban strongholds, including a dramatic acceleration of nighttime raids against suspected insurgents, averaging over 300 per month from early 2010 to mid-2011. This dramatic escalation featured the use of a rejuvenated counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) that had been pioneered by CENTCOM commander Petraeus in Iraq, specifically designed to break the pacification-repacificiation cycle. The most prominent early effort took place in the Marja region, a Taliban stronghold, and the negative results there provided a clear illustration of both the failure of the new COIN...
strategy and the elements that constituted the vicious cycle of pacification.

In the viewpoint of U.S. military strategists, the cycle of pacification producing immiseration triggering rebellious reconstruction triggering pacification triggering enhanced immiseration triggering enhanced rebellion triggering re-pacificiation would be broken in Afghanistan by COIN’s chief innovation—a ‘clear, hold, and build’ philosophy. Since the renewed rebellion most often occurs once the military moves on to new battles, this algorithm requires a medium-term military presence in each local community (the ‘hold’ part of the strategy) leading later (as the ‘build’ part of the strategy takes hold) into the shared sovereignty proposed by Krasner, in which indigenous officials eventually shoulder responsibility for ongoing administration (Krasner 2005). While the ‘clear’ and ‘hold’ elements more-or-less-inevitably create new waves of immiseration and potential rebellion, the ‘build’ stage is designed to defuse the clear-and-hold-generated-bitterness by erecting a new infrastructure capable of supporting political, economic, and social renewal.

Beyond the fabulous resources needed to apply such a strategy across entire countries like Afghanistan and Iraq—or even targeted to rebellious regions, like the Taliban strongholds in the south of Afghanistan or the ‘Sunni triangle’ and Anbar Province in Iraq—an inevitable contradiction between COIN and the transformative goals of the U.S. occupation makes breaking the cycle breathtakingly difficult. The transformative agenda implies minimal rebuilding—or, more likely, active dismantling—of local social and economic arrangements. Thus, the ‘build’ part of ‘clear, hold and build’ cannot involve rebuilding the existing village-town-city structure; instead, it must be further dismantled and replaced with the new ‘open’ political economy mandated by twenty-first century U.S. foreign policy. As retired army colonel Douglas Macgregor—a West Point class mate of Petraeus’ commanding general within Afghanistan, David McChrystal—put it, COIN applied to the Middle East called upon CENTCOM to ‘reshape the culture of the Islamic world,’ one village-town-neighborhood and city at a time.62

In his congressional testimony, Petraeus (2009) gestured at the depth of the project when he mentioned the necessity of rooting out opium production and replacing it with an entirely new rural
economy. This agricultural transformation was part of a larger transformation, including a revolutionized cultural and political life, since opium cultivation had become a major foundation for Taliban governance in contested areas.

A few months later, the ill fated General McChrystal described this strategy in the context of his first major COIN offensive in the Marja region, promising that the 'build' operation would be quite rapid, because 'We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in' (Filkins 2010). That is, once the resistance was defeated, he would 'roll in' a governing structure, populated by pre-trained Afghan administrators uncontaminated by commitment to the soon-to-be replaced local political economy. Sharing sovereignty with the U.S. military that had just conquered the area, they would quickly begin building a whole new social and economic system, from schools to agriculture to police forces. To paraphrase General Petraeus, in Iraq and Afghanistan the goal was to 'clear, hold, and build,' not 'clear, hold, and rebuild' (Petraeus 2009).

In Marja and numberless other localities in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency strategy foundered on the impracticality of importing a whole new society into a conquered province or village. The prosperous future that McChrystal's 'government in a box' was supposed to deliver could not possibly materialize, nor could the agricultural revolution promised in Petraeus' congressional testimony.

Instead, each successful military occupation began by placing the target community in dire circumstances. The battle itself is likely to cause grievous harm to the local residents, as McChrystal himself conceded in a briefing to his troops after the Marja offensive had become unhinged:

To my knowledge, in the nine-plus months I've been here, not a single case where we have engaged in an escalation of force incident and hurt someone has it turned out that the vehicle had a suicide bomb or weapons in it and, in many cases, had families in it. That doesn't mean I'm criticizing the people [NATO soldiers] who are executing. I'm just giving you perspective. We've shot an amazing number of people and killed a
number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat to the force (Elliott 2010; see also Oppel 2010).

The harm done in these firefights was only the beginning. If the battle itself was not calamitous, the ‘clear’ and ‘hold’ process inevitably involves hunting down suspected combatants and their supporters (based on worse than imperfect intelligence), home invasions, and the use of lethal force at any sign of resistance or escape (Gall 2011; Tirman 2011:272-6). Any possessions useful to resistance are confiscated and responsible parties arrested. Shops and merchants suspected (or capable) of aiding the resistance have their wares confiscated, and the offending elements of the local structure are dismantled. In the villages of Marja—and elsewhere in Iraq and Afghanistan—the arrival of U.S. or NATO forces triggered accelerated immiseration, flowing from the physical and economic assault, military or civilian. As one resident in the area considered to be largely sympathetic to the occupation told the *New York Times*, ‘people in the villages are more scared of the Americans than of the Taliban’ (Gall 2011).

According to counterinsurgency theory, the newly built system should more-than-offset this initial destruction and alienation. But even when a ‘government in a box’ is ready to go, this work is problematic at best, and made infinitely more difficult when transformation is at the center of the agenda. When unaffiliated NGOs enter Afghan or Iraqi towns as part of the human rights regime to repair war damage, they can hope to harness the energy and resources of the local community, and utilize local leadership and institutions as allies.63 These local initiatives are often opposed by the occupation, since they can interfere with the transformative goals that accompany military humanism. Duffield summarized this contradiction in discussing the opposition among many political and military leaders to ameliorative aid programs initiated by the human rights regime, delivered without conditions that integrate the local economy into the discipline of transnational markets:

As a free good, that is, something that is given rather than earned, for many strategic actors [such

~238~

© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
as military humanists] humanitarian assistance conjures up a number of free-market concerns and economic fears. Indeed, the idea of relief, especially the prospect of a long-term commitment in relation to the new wars, has created something of a moral panic in [neo]liberal circles. A particular phobia is that badly managed or unnecessary relief assistance will encourage dependency among recipients—since the distribution of free goods creates economic disincentives that are antithetical to self-sufficiency and the workings of a market economy. It is argued, usually without much in the way of supporting evidence, that free goods can discourage household production, undermine markets and sap individual industry and enterprises (IDC 1999). To the extent that this takes place, humanitarian action can actually deepen the cycle of destitution and impoverishment: it can strengthen dependency (Duffield, 2001:102).

Duffield cites the policy of the European Union, which explicitly acknowledged that humanitarian aid should be withheld when it interfered with prescribed transformation: ‘Within EU policy, consequently, a tension is evident in the requirement that while a commitment to humanitarian action must remain, relief assistance should not undermine “the way back to a long-term development process.”’

The ‘build’ process in a transformative COIN campaign, therefore, attempts to impose a new set of social, political, and economic arrangements on unwilling subjects who most likely hate or fear the occupation, and the process often involves further undermining the lifestyle that locals are seeking to restore or sustain. In this context, the occupation must expend a large quantum of energy and resources to impose this new system on the resistant local populace. This is a daunting project in any context, but it is made all-the-more difficult when the local community retains the ability to
resist and rebel, the circumstances across Iraq and Afghanistan (as well as other potential and actual sites of twenty-first century intervention).

In the Marja region of Afghanistan, the cycle took less than two years to reach a new crescendo. Three months into the surge, General Petraeus announced that 2386 Taliban had been captured or killed in Marja and other targeted provinces, a number that grew to 6100 by the end of 2009 (Porter 2011a). By June 2010, however, the local insurgents had returned to prominence in many of the villages; Afghan officials reported that ‘the population had become more antagonistic to NATO forces than was the case before the operation began’ (Lobe 2010a); the Washington Post reported that the ‘government in a box’ was ‘largely empty’; and commanding general McChrystal conceded the project was ‘even more complex that we thought,’ calling the region ‘a bleeding ulcer.’

In early summer 2011, independent reporter Gareth Porter (2011b), working from official U.S. Defense Department data, documented the amplified violence of the pacification-repacific cycle in Marja and other areas targeted by President Obama’s surge strategy. In May of 2011, the number of insurgent attacks was at least 40% above the pre-surge baseline, despite the ongoing presence of NATO forces in many of the most rebellious areas. Even when following the COIN ‘clear, hold, and build’ formula, the outcome was amplified resistance.

The same pattern emerged in the highly publicized Bush Administration surge in Iraq, which created constantly accelerating insurgent violence until it was abandoned in 2008 (Schwartz 2008).

PART IV – THE IMMISERATION CYCLE WITHIN THE PACIFICATION CYCLE

The literature on military humanism places stress on the dangers, both direct and indirect, of kinetic military action generating immiseration for the populations where the fighting takes place (see Part I above). This literature also acknowledges the growing involvement of intervening military forces in the economic and social infrastructure of the host countries, as an expression of both military primacy in extending neoliberal globalization and the incorporation of human rights motives into kinetic military intervention (also reviewed
in Part I above). In discussing these issues, however, most of the literature focuses on the national political process, with the military attacking and/or replacing the incumbent regime and coercing new economic and social policies more consistent with the economic and humanitarian goals of the intervention. There is only occasional attention given to the injection of military primacy into the day-to-day life of indigenous communities after the initial fighting has abated.68

Partly this neglect reflects the focus of this literature on the pre-2001 interventions, in which this new military primacy in the economic and social spheres was carefully delimited. It was only after 9-11 that the expansive military role received full expression. Even in Afghanistan, this role evolved after the ouster of the Taliban regime, and it matured in parallel to the ‘post-conflict’ policies in Iraq.

Writing just before the start of the Iraq war, Army War College planners Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill explicitly considered the qualitatively new role for the military in the post ‘post conflict’ period in Iraq. They began by analyzing the 1990s humanitarian-justified interventions in Panama, Haiti and Bosnia, which featured strictly delimited rules for leaving local (not national) systems intact, supporting (but not actively participating in) locally initiated reconstruction, prompt withdrawal of all military forces, and eschewing all direct ‘nation building.’ Transformative tasks were instead allocated to the human rights regime—U.S. civilian agencies, NGOs and international government bodies—and the newly reformed indigenous governments (2003)69. Crane and Terrill then proffered a dramatically different plan for the military in the forthcoming Iraq invasion. During a four phase process lasting several years, they expected on-the-ground military primacy in a huge range of activities, including the nurturing of ‘outside investment, jobs programs, and educational institutions.’ While U.S. civilian agencies and Iraqi officials would eventually inherit primary responsibility (perhaps as quickly as three years), Crane and Terrill warned that a timely transfer ‘could not be assumed in Iraq,’ given earlier negative experiences with ‘civilian’ leadership, and the specific conditions expected to develop after the ouster of the Hussein regime. 70

This shift was duly noted by Kaldor in the preface to the Second Edition of her aptly titled volume New and Old Wars, in which she commented that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars used troops
(and humanitarian agencies) ‘in new ways,’ warning that the attempted enactment of these expansive responsibilities in the two wars ‘may have discredited the very notion of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping’ (2007:ix,x–xi).

In this section, we consider the processes at work in the military-primacy dynamics in Iraq and Afghanistan that further degrades the well-being of the resident population, creating an immiseration cycle within the pacification-repacificiation cycle. The argument focuses on the following constituent parts:

◇ *Chronic under-resourcing and the immiseration cycle.* The failure to provide sufficient resources to complete and implement local economic and social reconstruction flows from the neoliberal ideology that relies on private initiative and financing. These considerations increase the probability that locally initiated reconstruction will fail and that occupation-initiated construction leads to further degradation.

◇ *Neoliberal reconstruction and the inevitability of corruption.* While indigenous politicians and private companies participate in siphoning off large portions of reconstruction budgets, the primary source of this corruption is the network of international corporations placed in charge of underfunded transformative projects with few barriers to siphoning.

◇ *Markets without Investments.* Structural adjustment as part of neoliberal reform relies on—after a period of difficulty—outside investment producing an expanding market economy delivering new jobs and new products. The dynamics of military-primacy generates structural adjustment without investment, thus deepening the downward spiral of immiseration. Even the Iraqi oil industry, one of the most attractive investment
opportunities in the global economy, contributed to this process, making it an instructive example for glimpsing and analyzing the toxic mixture of military humanism and neoliberal reform.

Chronic Under-Resourcing and the Immiseration Cycle

The ‘build’ phase of COIN in Marja and elsewhere failed to prevent a new round of resistance. This failure derived from the impracticality of importing a social system, half or fully formed, into an immiserated community struggling to survive (or escape) an increasingly desperate situation. What might be done quickly—patching up existing economic and social systems (the sort of work often undertaken by human rights NGOs and UN agencies in these settings)—was excluded by the transformative project, since such repair work would help to restore the old structure that the occupation sought to displace. Building a new system required huge infusions of U.S. aid, and/or massive investment from international capital—with positive results produced in time to reverse the existing or impending calamity. None of these pre-requisites were met in Marja (or in other regions in Afghanistan or Iraq that had been targets of earlier or current pacification efforts).

In the context of the COIN ‘clear, hold, and build’ strategy, support from local communities was, at least initially, rarely possible. The already immiserated conditions—exacerbated by the destructive impact of ‘clear and hold’—assures a reservoir of bitterness and anger (and, in many localities, organized rebellion). It is conceivable that the arrival of rejuvenating resources could, in the medium term, win over some or most local residents. Producing this type of improvement is therefore fundamental to COIN success.

It is in this context, that General David McChrystal’s ‘government in a box’ might have been a reasonable strategy, if it had led to a successful ‘build’ in the Marja district and other regions targeted by the Obama surge. The strategy foundered, however, on two intractable problems that are high-probability (if not inevitable) components of the military-primary economic and social reconstruction: the need for resources that exceed the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to provide, and their almost-inevitable misuse when the projects are directed either by the military itself or by
outside (often foreign) profit-seeking corporations integrated into the transnational capitalist class. We address the first of these problems here, and then consider the reliance on corporate outsiders in the next section.

Destructive development. Consider then, the infusion of U.S. aid to Marja, implemented in a shared sovereignty arrangement combining the NATO military and the pre-packaged ‘government in a box,’ with financing provided by various U.S. government agencies. In Marja, a USAID effort to provide 4,000 water pumps was quickly ‘scaled back by 75%’ because the shared-sovereignty administration could provide neither the security needed to protect the new installations nor the expertise needed to train locals in their installation and operation. More elaborate construction projects, including the revival and modernization of an abandoned irrigation system, were scrapped because locals could not implement the imported plan by themselves, and the shared-sovereignty administration had insufficient resources to fund and staff the project (Chandrasekaran 2010).

In some sense, the problems derive from inadequate resources devoted to the projects. With a far larger investment, USAID might have financed the successful installation of the 4,000 water pumps (using outside contractors or NGOs), the local residents might have been trained to operate and maintain them (again by outsiders), and an ongoing infusion of resources would finance fuel and maintenance costs. With even more resources, the badly needed irrigation system could have become an actionable project. Such a investment would have, however, been a budget buster for USAID, which could not afford to provide uninstalled water pumps to all the localities that needed them, let alone provide the services needed to get them running. The irrigation system was beyond impractical.

Perhaps the most salient element of this doomed-from-the-beginning situation is that local residents came to view even the trimmed-back water pump initiative with disgust. Their evaluation rested on the comparison of the new system—which fulfilled its reduced promise of 1000 new pumps—with the older inadequate water system it was supposed to replace. The older system, damaged by the fighting and by long-term decay, could have been repaired by the villagers themselves with a small infusion of capital to buy
materials and/or traditional NGO aid. Even expansion was feasible with another dollop of resources to buy new equipment that the locals already knew how to install and operate. In their calculus, this locally-based reconstruction would have provided substantially more water than the handful of new pumps that eventually went on line.

As a consequence, then, of a project designed to modernize the water system, the villagers experienced further immiseration deriving from the consequences of their now-chronically inadequate water supply, including the lack of irrigation for crops, the taxing process of hauling supplies long distances, and the health problems deriving from contamination.

The restoration project that the local residents had unsuccessfully demanded would have fit within the budget of USAID, but it was the path unchosen. It was a non-starter because the restored system would strengthen the insular local system in its resistance both to the occupation and to the economic ‘opening’ process designed to attract outside investment and project the local economy into the global economic system. The water pump project thus became a crystalline example of what Suhrke labeled ‘destructive development’ (Surke 2007:1293).

Resource shortages and neoliberal reconstruction. Consider, then, the resource shortages that sabotaged the effectiveness of the new water pumping initiatives. With Afghan war expenses running at eight billion dollars per month (Center for Defense Information 2011), funding 4000 new water pumps would be budgetary child’s play. The ultimate problem, therefore, was not simply the cost, but rather the overarching neoliberal orientation to twenty-first century intervention. Writ large, military intervention was meant to ‘open’ these areas to the globalized market economy. The ‘build’ part of counterinsurgency should derive not primarily from the infusion of government subsidies, but from private enterprise seizing profitable opportunities in newly pacified and stabilized areas. Private enterprise would therefore make the choices about which areas could support self-supporting development, and leave aside those which would be unable to support themselves and thus become a long term drain on resources (Natsios 2001; Jones 2009).

The ‘government in a box’ imported by surging NATO
troops was not supposed rebuild those areas without economic promise; it was instead tasked with establishing security and undertaking pilot projects that demonstrated the promise of economic development, and therefore attract private capital to (only) those areas where profitable development was possible. The few water pumps ultimately installed may have been inadequate for restoring water viability to the local areas impacted, and miscalculation (and even corruption) may have reduced the planned number by 75% or more, but these shortages derived ultimately from the determination to let the market decide where reconstruction should and would occur.

These on-the-ground budget problems hamstrung virtually all the work in Marja—problems replicated in hundreds of locations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, the investment simply did not materialize, even in areas with little fighting and histories of viable commerce. Consequently, there was virtually no visible alleviation of the local economic crisis in the first two years of the COIN project in Afghanistan (replicating the lack of progress in both countries over the years since the initial invasions). Washington Post interviews found locals seeing the few tangible signs of progress—for example, a few day-labor jobs, and a few schools opened briefly—offset by far more daunting degradation—for example, the loss of opium income and the destruction of bridges to prevent their use by the still unpacified insurgency. Journalist Ann Jones captured the mood in the Afghan villages subjected to COIN:

The formula, which is basic COIN, goes something like this: kill some civilians in the hunt for the bad guys and you have to make up for it by building a road. This trade-off explains why, as you travel parts of the country, interminable (and often empty) strips of black asphalt now traverse Afghanistan’s vast expanses of sand and rock, but it doesn’t explain why Afghans, thus compensated, are angrier than ever.

Many Afghans, of course, are angry because they haven’t been compensated at all, not even with a road to nowhere. Worse yet, more often than not,
they’ve been promised things [like water pumps] that never materialize (Jones, 2010).

In Kandahar province, not far from Marja, the road construction initiatives became the poster child illustrating both under-resourcing and the immiseration cycle within the pacification cycle. The late 2010 pacification campaign against the Taliban encountered strong resistance, and the fighting exacted a heavy toll on the residents and the physical infrastructure. The village of Taroko Kalacha, for example, ‘was so heavily mined by the Taliban that American forces resorted to aerial bombardment and leveled the whole village of 36 homes.’

The Afghan government estimated the cost of rebuilding from the Kandahar offensive at $100 million, while the NATO military command offered a more modest estimate of $30 million. Ultimately, both estimates were magnitudes higher than the actual expenditure in direct reconstruction; in the ensuing four months, NATO had paid less than four million dollars in compensation, with the rate of payment quickly tapering off. These niggardly outlays apparently reflected the neoliberal structural adjustment approach to reconstruction: potentially viable localities would attract private investment that would obviate the need for full compensation; while subsidies that could sustain the rejuvenation of ultimately non-viable locales would be counterproductive. A better investment was to apply the bulk of the reconstruction budget to the military’s dual-purpose initiatives, centered on installing ‘new roads which they hope will bring greater security and prosperity.’

In Panjwaii, one of the villages in the district where wine production constituted the agricultural foundation of the economy, the strip of ‘black asphalt’ soon under construction traversed a number of vineyards, definitively destroying the livelihood (and the ancestral lands) of those effected, with woefully inadequate compensation adding insult to injury. More generally devastating was the destruction of the venerable, but viable, irrigation system, leaving ‘acres of vineyards without water,’ and causing a plurality of residents seeing ‘their only source of livelihood taken away.’

As highway construction proceeded, the local anger found various forms of expression. Tribal and religious leaders petitioned the
government in a box’ officials and the NATO officers to alter the
route or cancel the highway altogether. Affected residents mounted
various public protests, including the much-applauded act of civil
disobedience by Bor Muhammad, who ‘lay down in front of
bulldozers in an effort to save his farm.’ When this failed, he was given
$6,000 compensation, far too little to restore his family finances, and
Muhammad vowed to ultimately ‘wrest his land back.’

Abdul Nafi, a farmer who lost his two acres of vines and
almond trees to the road, spoke for many in the community when he
told the New York Times, ‘The people are angry. The foreigners should
not upset the people, otherwise they would go and join the Taliban.’

Perhaps he and Bor Muhammad were among the group of
residents who contacted the Taliban, which promised ‘to blow up the
road and return their land to them’ as soon as military situation made
it possible.

These events raise the question of why the occupation and its
nascent Afghan government chose the highway as its signature
reconstruction project, when its destructive, immiserating, and
infuriating impact was visible to the naked eye of both residents and
occupiers; and/or why the occupation failed to provide at least
sufficient compensation to offer residents the hope of rehabilitating
their living standards. Partly the answer lies in the rigor with which
neoliberal principles have been applied in Iraq, Afghanistan and other
sites of U.S. intervention since 911, which sought to wean civil society
(in the Middle East and elsewhere) from its reliance on state activism
to address all issues, and force these localities into the globalized
economy, where they would prosper or flounder based to their ability
to create attractive investment opportunities.

These policies made the ‘black asphalt’ an attractive
investment, since it could become an infrastructural foundation for
opening these insular locations to world trade, and therefore facilitate
the search for profit seeking investment, provided the locals
positioned themselves to take advantage of the opportunity. In this
context, the destruction to the local economy might itself be
‘constructive,’ since the economically denuded landscape would be
available for new investment with better prospects in the international
market.

At the same time, the primacy of the military in making these

© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
choices also pushed toward the ‘black asphalt’ reconstruction policies. After nine years of the pacification-repacificaiton cycle in Afghanistan, the NATO forces were sensitive to lessons learned in previous iterations. Canadian Major Eric Landry explained to the New York Times that the absence of transportation between outposts had facilitated the successful Taliban revival in the area after a 2007 pacification campaign. Major Landry extracted this lesson from the 2007 pacification cycle: ‘It is important to get this [highway] built before the next fighting season.’ In Major Landry’s view—and that of many NATO commanders—the pacification cycle was endless, and he was determined to use reconstruction funds to facilitate the next repacificaiton campaign.

In Helmond Province, where Marja is located, and in Kandahar Province, where Pnajwalli and Taroko Kalacha are located, the Obama surge offered a crystalline illustration of the immiseration cycle embedded within the pacification-repacificaiton cycle.

- The entry of the occupation military into the area triggered a round of fighting, leaving the residents in newly immiserated conditions.
- Neoliberal policy insured that any delivered compensation would be insufficient to support self-actuated rebuilding of the existing economic and social infrastructure.
- Occupation initiated reconstruction, animated by military goals and neoliberal economic policy, further degraded local conditions while attempting to lay a foundation for outside investment, but in the immediate circumstances initiating further immiseration.
- Eventually, local residents organized resistance, some passive, some disruptive, some violent.
- The occupation, faced with renewed rebellion, entered into a new ‘fighting season,’—a new round of pacification.
Neoliberal Reconstruction and the Inevitability of Corruption

The cycle of immiseration operating in small villages and rural regions of Afghanistan was matched at the national level in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, affecting large portions of the country in a single sweeping process. This much larger canvas for the concentric cycles of pacification and immiseration allows us to glimpse the processes that produce corruption as a major feature of both the occupation regime and the client government it produces.

In Iraq, the United Nations estimated that $80 billion would be required to rebuild the existing infrastructure (water, sewage, electricity, roads, hospitals, schools) after the brief but destructive war that ousted the Hussein regime. The cost of transforming that infrastructure into one able to serve an economy integrated into the globalized world would have been magnitudes larger. Nevertheless, the United States allocated only $20 billion to the project, attracting (mostly unfulfilled) promises of an additional five billion from its ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ and expecting to apply (perhaps $10 billion) Hussein era oil earnings to the kitty. As the war morphed into a six-year pacification campaign, the cycle of pacification-immiseration-protest-repacificaiton took its toll; the projected cost of simple reconstruction escalated dramatically, while the U.S. reconstruction allocation shrunk (with much of the budget diverted to security expenses). Ultimately, the occupation spent only $11 billion on reconstruction against a projected cost above $200 billion, leaving every effort impossibly underfunded.

The electrical system in Iraq, fundamental to personal and economic life, received an infusion of $4.8 billion against a reconstruction cost estimated in 2006 at over $20 billion. In 2010, the Iraqi electrical grid generated fewer hours of electricity per day than it had just after the initial U.S. offensive severely damaged it, a stark (and fully visible) symptom of the immiseration process experienced during the seven years of occupation (Schwartz 2008:154-5; McDermid and Walled 2010). In this instance—and in other infrastructural areas including water purification, medical care, housing, education, and transportation—the years of occupation had produced a palpable decline in the quality of life (Schwartz 2008).

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the impossibility of reconstructing the indigenous countries based on the budget allowed...
by U.S. government only partially explains the failure to re-engineer the social and economic infrastructure. Even the relatively meager $11 billion invested in Iraq could have (or should have) produced at least moderate improvements in infrastructural functioning; and if the fully allocated amount has been invested in reconstruction, the results might have been substantial. In Afghanistan, the United States pledged $10.4 billion, ultimately delivering $5 billion with similarly negative effects (Jones 2009).

The tale of decline instead of modest improvement resulting from the infusion of vast sums of investment derived from the transformative goal of U.S. policy, harnessed once again to the details of the military occupation. The goal of these investments was not to implement a viable infrastructure, but rather to lay a foundation for attracting outside investment. This ambition was articulated by Andrew Natsios, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), who described U.S. reconstruction aid as aimed at helping ‘nations prepare for participation in the global trading system and become better markets for U.S. exports’ (Natsios 2001; quoted in Jones 2009). This soaring ambition was not, however, fulfilled. In July of 2011, after eight years of preparing Iraq ‘for participation in the global trading system,’ James Jeffreys, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, conceded that, ‘What we haven't seen yet ... is a lot of American investment’ (Chaudry 2011). Without this investment, even the most successful reconstruction projects produced destructive development, contributing to the ongoing degradation of local life.

Why neoliberal reconstruction produces corruption. The marriage of underfunded reconstruction harnessed to neoliberal transformation and military pacification placed everyone involved under a complex set of cross cutting pressures.

One of these cross-cutting pressures arose from the ground level. Because these transformational projects (like the highway building campaign in Afghanistan) were contradictory to the will of indigenous civil society and outside their area of competence, those called upon to enact these projects would have to be outsiders, and this necessity fit comfortably into the neoliberal stance of privatizing economic enterprise and attracting globalized enterprise.

In Iraq, for example, the core enterprises in the pre-invasion
electrical industry were government-owned—key elements in the insular, state-dominated economy that U.S. policy was committed to dismantling. These enterprises were therefore among the 192 state-owned firms shuttered in the first six months of the U.S. occupation in 2003 (Schwartz 2008). Many of the private sector companies in this industry quickly collapsed without government subsidies and contracts; and the occupation regime disqualified most of the survivors from participation in U.S.-sponsored reconstruction because their competence lay in the outmoded local installations, incompatible with the globalized technology that the U.S. sought to introduce into the country.

These same dynamics operated in Afghanistan’s agricultural areas. With opium at the core of the rural economy, the entire operation needed to be dismantled, including suppliers, working farms, and the merchants handling the raw or refined product. The new system would necessarily require the importation of supplies, machinery and experts to rework the agriculture economy, replacing those associated with opium production (Jones 2009).

In both cases, the occupation hired multinational companies, many with enduring ties to the U.S. military, to undertake large new projects. These contractors, apparently selected for their integration into the ‘global trading system’ (Natsios 2002), were nevertheless severely handicapped in their ability to operate in Iraq or Afghanistan. Because of the insularity of these societies, these outsiders had no experience with local construction challenges. Among other difficulties, their lack of familiarity with the technical aspects of the local infrastructure led them to remove, bypass, or destroy local facilities, rather than modifying their proprietary technology or products to complement the existing system. In doing so, they increased the cost of construction substantially, while rendering local technicians’ skills obsolete or irrelevant; assuring further dependence on the foreign vendors, if the new systems were completed. The new development thus excluded local artisans, merchants, and entrepreneurs, with many joining the growing army of the physically and economically displaced, and the insurgency.

This logic, much more than the so-frequently-mentioned security problems caused by ongoing insurgency, added magnitudes to the cost of introducing new systems. But more significantly, it meant
that much of the work involved dismantling or destroying functional or repairable facilities. Thus, even while construction proceeded, the ongoing degradation of the existing system continued. In practice, this often involved yet another decline in quality of life—with the benefits waiting until the completion of a new project. In more than a few cases, the new system failed to outperform the old system, and in many cases it was never successfully completed.

In the case of the Iraqi electrical grid, Bechtel, the U.S. contractor in charge of reconstruction, declared much of the decrepit old system (which had been preserved over the years by ingenious local engineers) irredeemable. Bechtel removed the old generators, and installed 26 new gas driven turbines slated to double the generating capacity. The natural gas needed to fuel the generators was, however, unavailable (Iraq had one small natural gas pipeline) and—after months of delays—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers adapted the turbines to utilize fuel oil instead. This adaptation, however, reduced the turbines to 50% of capacity, making the new generators no more productive than the old ones they replaced. Moreover, the fuel oil soon caused maintenance problems that Iraqi technicians (not trained in either the new technology or the gerry-rigged adaptation to fuel oil) were unable to resolve. During the next three years, the turbines spent long periods off line, with an increasing number permanently idled as the years of misuse accumulated. Ultimately, the new system produced less electricity than the decrepit system it replaced, and far below the growing demand (SIGIR 2006; Schwartz 2008:165f).

This sort of destructive development flowed naturally from the mismatch between U.S. contractors and the practical necessities of Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to massive cost overruns, endemic maintenance problems, and frequent failures of completed projects (Chatterjee 2004,2009; Jamail 2007; Schwartz 2008; Jones 2010). The high probability of failure in these circumstances attracted contractors accustomed to exploiting the ambiguities and uncertainties of the situation, dubbed ‘no-bid Beltway bandits’ by journalist Ann Jones because they sought expensive projects without competitive bidding, with the intention of siphoning funds into their bottom line while leaving the projects undone or under-constructed (Jones 2009).

The sketchy regulatory presence further encouraged
incompetence and corruption. Neither the new indigenous government—with its at-best nascent administrative structure—nor the U.S. occupation—relying on military units untrained in supervising the construction of economic infrastructure—could be expected to supervise, regulate, and discipline the work of these profit seeking contractors. In Iraq, the occupation applied the neo-liberal principle of replacing government regulation with market discipline, instituting a policy of self-regulation for contractors, with no inspections of in-process work. The contracting agency (usually the military, USAID, or the Iraqi government) evaluated the work at the end of the project, with the only sanction for failure being a small monetary fine and the danger of losing the next contract to better performing competitors. Given the highly politicized process in granting such contracts, however, this threat carried almost no weight; the unregulated system therefore invited massive waste, inefficiency, and fraud, with a multitude of projects ending with all the money expended and few tangible results. One key element in this cycle of waste and corruption was the inadequacy of the overall funding, which became an all-purpose justification for failure, and therefore a perfect camouflage for the siphoning funds away from productive investment.  

One of a multitude of such projects took place in Fallujah, the site of two battles in 2004 that destroyed 70% of the homes and most of the physical infrastructure. When the battles ended, Colonel John R. Ballard, a key planner for the Fallujah ‘build’ operation, enunciated the full COIN vision, telling the New York Times: ‘The best place to bring a model town into place is Fallujah.’ He promised the reconstructed city would be ‘a feat of social and physical engineering... intended to transform a bastion of militant anti-Americanism into a benevolent and functional metropolis.’ (Worth 2004; See also Schwartz 2008:114f).

Ballard and his colleagues decided ‘the first rebuilding project to win hearts and minds would be a citywide sewage treatment plant,’ replete with all the modern features available from the globalized economy (Williams 2010). But, consistent with the endemic underfunding of U.S. projects, $100 million was allocated to a project that the UN estimated would cost $250 million, with the new system scheduled to be completed in early 2007. On the expected completion
date, the contractor promised completion in two more years, warning, however, that the finished project would serve only a third of the city. But even this scaled-down ambition was unfulfilled; in June, 2010, ‘after more than six years of work, $104 million spent, and without having connected a single house, American reconstruction officials have decided to leave the troubled system only partly finished.’ Timothy Williams of *New York Times* reported that the news ‘infuriating many city residents’ (Williams 2010).

Underfunding was thus only part of the problem in Fallujah—and in other projects with similar outcomes. While UN estimates indicated that the $100 million allocation could have provided sewage for a third of the city, but instead no homes were ultimately served. Instead, the $100 million allocation constituted revenues that flowed from the U.S. treasury to politically connected contractors with minimal constructive impact on-the-ground in Iraq. (In an ironic denouement to the U.S. effort, the departing contractors announced that—if the Iraqi government funded its completion—the system they partially constructed would service only one-sixth of the homes in the city (Williams 2010).)

The construction projects funded by the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq yielded, at best, marginal improvements, in many cases more-than-offset by the dismantling of existing infrastructure. All too frequently, like the sewage system in Fallujah, they yielded no tangible results, except the transfer of money from the U.S. government to the bottom line of unsupervised private contractors.

This form of higher corruption is an inevitable by-product of the marriage of military occupation to economic transformation. The combination of destructive occupation with imported, unsupervised, underfunded profit-seeking contractors mandated to impose a new society on a resistant and often well organized indigenous population is a recipe for corruption. Large ‘aid’ allocations delivered to politically connected contractors reappear in overseas bank accounts, often without even passing through the target society. Journalist Ann Jones, in discussing USAID funded projects in Afghanistan, vividly described this process:

Regularly, USAID now hands over huge hunks of
‘aid’ money to big, impossibly ambitious, quick-fix projects run by the usual no-bid Beltway Bandit contractors whose incompetence, wastefulness, unconscionable profits, and outright fraud should be a national scandal.

This, too, is a process everyone knows but can’t speak about because it’s not part of the official script in which the U.S. must be seen as developing backward Afghanistan, instead of sending it reeling into the darkest of ages. Despairing humanitarians recall that Hillary Clinton promised as secretary of state to clean house at USAID, which, she said, had become nothing but ‘a contracting shop.’ Well, here’s a flash from Afghanistan: it’s still a contracting shop, and the contracts are going to the same set of contractors who have been exposed again and again as venal, fraudulent, and criminal.80

Iraq and Afghanistan are famously corrupt, ranked in 2010 at 175 and 176 among 178 countries by Transparency International’s corruption index, with only Myanmar and Somalia rated more corrupt. Because each government participates in such spectacular incidents of corruption these rankings appear to be well earned without any contribution of the occupation. However, in terms of monetary magnitude, and in terms of social impact, the corruption originating in the intervention is magnitudes larger, and it is the ultimate source and sustenance of indigenous corruption. Together indigenous and occupation corruption are organic to the fundamental dynamics of what Noam Chomsky (1999) has called military humanism, and fully integrated into both the pacification and immiseration cycles it produces.81

Markets Without Investors

Ultimately, the marriage of military occupation to political economic transformation generates immediate and degradation of local conditions. The promise of economic and social improvement
therefore relies on the privatization aspect of structural adjustment: attracting ample quantities of foreign capital, animated by the promised-to-be-superb investment opportunities in the previously closed economy. This process had a quantum of validity in many countries that experienced structural adjustment under the leverage of international finance organizations. The military-primacy situation in Iraq and Afghanistan was supposed to follow these earlier patterns. Initial infusions of U.S. government funds would establish or demonstrate the viability of profitable investment, and would therefore (sooner, rather than later) be supplanted by private investment, producing efficient agricultural, extractive, manufacturing, or service industries equipped to compete in the globalized market. In 2001, USAID Director Andrew Natsios told Congress that the ‘transition’ of developing nations to ‘market economies,’ a fundamental goal of the agency’s policies, relied on ‘leveraging private funding for our development projects’ In this vision, even a failing USAID effort that led to further immiseration could ultimately generate positive results, if its net effect was to ‘leverage substantial private resources to achieve our development and foreign policy goals’ (Natsios 2001).

This vision had a certain plausible logic in Iraq, with its 115 billion barrels of proven, but largely undeveloped, oil reserves. However, in the first seven years of the occupation, the lure of Iraqi oil did not attract private investment; and it therefore did not generate the anticipated immediate stimulation of increased oil production (and its anticipated flood of revenues). An even more important failure may have been the fact that the dearth of oil investment meant a dearth of investment in the roads, electrical generation, and secondary industry that oil development was expected to inspire, and which would have (could have) re-employed the multitudes of newly unemployed, and would have (could have) rehabilitated needed services to the immiserated residents of the country.

This failure, in the most propitious of circumstances, illustrates the more general problem with expecting military humanism to be the engine for market driven economic revival. Immediately after the fall of the Hussein regime, with trade barriers removed, U.S. and European imports did arrive in substantial quantities, supplying the Iraqi middle class with products never-before-available, including...
cell phones, air conditioners, and various other electric and electronic commodities. If such sales had been sustained over a several-year period, they might have motivated investment in assembly and production plants to serve the ongoing market for these and other staples of the global economy. This moment, however, soon passed when structural adjustment swept through the Iraqi economy.

By the winter of 2003, the newly installed U.S. occupation government, led by L. Paul Bremer, had administered a particularly drastic form of neoliberal ‘shock treatment’ that could not have been possible without the military conquest that allowed for the total annihilation of the Hussein government. Bremer’s initial masterstroke involved shutting down 192 government-owned enterprises comprising 35% of the economy, a move justified by the promise that the state subsidized goods and services provided by these inefficient enterprises would be replaced by superior imports, and—in the medium term—manufacturing plants assembling these products inside Iraq. This draconian measure gave concrete expression to what President George W. Bush would later characterize as the ‘reforms needed to transition from a command-and-control economy to a modern market-based system’ (Bush 2008).

The resulting unemployment and economic decline was amplified by the demise of enterprises that supplied or were supplied by the state-owned firms, producing a massive depression that engulfed the country, with unemployment rates reaching as high as 60%. This sudden and drastic change generated all manner of protest: demonstrations, strikes, and protest marches; subsistence and criminal looting; and demands for services by local tribal and religious leaders (or ad hoc governments that had arose in the administrative vacuum); and a surge in violent attacks against occupation forces (Schwartz 2008).

This atmosphere was anathema to outside investment. While U.S. and European firms continued to ship products into Iraq (in decreasing amounts as the economy declined), they had zero incentive to invest in production or service facilities. Any such investment would be beyond risky: the immediate prospects were negative, and their long term viability would depend upon the both economy reviving and the rebellion subsiding. It is not surprising that, as he prepared to leave office in 2008, President Bush would say that the
transition was going to ‘take more time’ (Bush 2008).

*Even oil could not attract investment capital.* The one exception to this negative investment climate could have been the Iraqi petroleum industry, which largely escaped the induced depression, since the Bremer regime chose not to shutter core state-owned enterprises associated with oil.85 By the fall of 2003, he had announced major changes in Iraqi law that would allow international oil companies to take proprietary control of Iraqi oil fields for 20 to 30 years (under what are called Production Sharing Contracts), an arrangement that would give the oil companies, and not the Iraqi government, control of development decisions and levels of production (Ehrenberg et al 2010:384-6,390-400). These sorts of opportunities no longer existed in the world of oil, because state-owned oil firms controlled virtually all accessible oil exploitation, and because there were few virgin oil fields of the size waiting for exploitation in Iraq. Nevertheless, no major or minor oil company stepped forward to accept Bremer’s offer.

The answer to this lack of interest was altogether too simple, and fully expressive of the fallacy in marrying military conquest with economic transformation. The development of these oil fields would require billions of dollars, and no responsible company would invest such vast sums in a location where the entire investment could be lost without compensation.

The immediate threat lay in international law, which requires an occupying power to leave the basic law of the occupied country untouched.86 Bremer’s oil policy was therefore illegal under international law, since he had abrogated the entire corpus of Iraqi hydrocarbon law, including the requirements that the government administer oil commerce and that the (non-existent) parliament endorse all contracts. While Bremer promised that the soon-to-be-created Iraqi government would validate any negotiated contracts, the oil companies were not going to risk their billions until they could deal with a sovereign government that could credibly guarantee the security of their investment.

Having destroyed the Hussein government as part of the transformational agenda, the occupation could not quickly create a satisfactory partner for the oil companies. Even after the formal transfer of sovereignty to the newly formed Iraqi government, all
manner of obstacles arose.

During the next five years, industry confidence in the capacity of the various governments installed in Baghdad (first headed by Iyad Allawi, later by Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nouri al-Maliki) to guarantee the security of production sharing contracts was repeatedly called into question by resistance emanating from many quarters. The labor movement, vivified by the fall of the Hussein regime, vigorously opposed such contracts, utilizing strikes and demonstrations to deter them. The newly formed Iraqi government therefore faced a viable threat that the arrival of foreign firms would trigger paralyzing strikes in the oil industry and other sectors that served it.

In the meantime, the insurgency, rooted in areas containing oil extraction, refining, and transportation facilities, interrupted production or siphoned off crude oil in response to policies friendly to the U.S. efforts; creating a credible threat of full-scale disruption of any ambitious development project (Schwartz 2006a). Local tribal and religious leadership, rising into the vacuum created by the collapsed national government, mobilized against the oil policy, demanding that local government controls employment, nominate subcontractors, and be delivered a share of the oil revenues. The Iraqi Oil Ministry, virtually the only administrative apparatus that survived (in a much diminished form) the U.S. dismantling of the Hussein government, demanded continued control of oil development, refusing to transfer administrative responsibility to international oil companies. The parliament insisted on the right to veto all proposed contracts, promising to refuse any contract that ceded decision-making to non-Iraqi oil firms.

Ultimately even Prime Minister Maliki withdrew his endorsement of the proposed contracts and authorized his oil minister to offer much less favorable contracts designed to preserve Iraqi government control over the oil fields and their development. Even these modified contracts generated ferocious Iraqi opposition that could prevent their activation.87

The negotiation of several small production sharing oil contracts between the Kurdish regional government and minor transnational oil companies underscored the effectiveness of this complex of opposition forces. The firms involved understood this to be a risky investment, but the stability of the Kurdish regional
government gave them confidence that the contracts would ultimately be honored. Nevertheless, the contracts ran afoul of institutional resistance within the newly formed Iraq government, which declared them illegally negotiated and therefore invalid. Only two of the contracts were activated, but when the newly developed oil fields began operating, the companies did not receive compensation for their investments, because the oil pipelines that carried the oil passed through Iraq proper. Neither the insurgency—which repeatedly sabotaged the pipeline or siphoned off oil—nor the national government—which collected the revenues from the sale of the oil, acknowledged any obligation to the oil companies. In 2010, neither of the oil companies had retrieved the many millions of dollars invested in exploration and development (Schwartz 2010; IOR 2010).

Seven years after the U.S. invasion, no major oil investment had yet occurred, and the vivification of the Iraqi economy remained a distant promise with no substance. If the incredible value of Iraqi oil (worth at least $10 trillion) could not attract foreign investment, then there was little prospect for investment in an ordinary country like Afghanistan (even with its hypothesized one trillion in mineral riches). The underlying logic of the Iraqi experience illuminates the lack of substance to the premise of the U.S. government that post-invasion societies can ‘leverage substantial private resources to achieve our development and foreign policy goals.’ The consequences of combining military occupation with dismantling the indigenous regime and then attempting to enact structural adjustment guarantees an immiserated population in localities with no legitimate governmental presence, organized into various forms of institutional or violent resistance. The economic degradation destroys the sorts of ready-markets that could motivate early investment. The absence of a viable government undermines any guarantees that investment will be protected long enough to return a profit. The multifaceted resistance includes many tendencies that view such investment as a threat to their resources, power, or way of life. No companies with even a rudimentary understanding of their own self-interest will risk substantial amounts of capital in such a setting.

Ultimately, the marriage of military conquest and social transformation produces the ongoing degradation of local life for as long as the project continues; at the same time it generates wave after
The concentric cycles of pacification and immiseration encompass the active role of local communities and individuals. Civil society within villages, towns, and cities initiates its own projects at various moments. The activists energizing these efforts may seek to directly rebuild lives and/or infrastructure injured by kinetic military action; they may demand support for these efforts from the government or the occupation, or expect help from the human rights regime; or they may become involved in various forms of passive, active, or violent resistance aimed at frustrating any or all of elements in the ‘clear, hold, and build’ cycle.

The nature of this response varies among individuals and communities, as well as evolving during the various iterations of violence and reconstruction. This variation determines, to a considerable degree, whether the pacification and immiseration cycles might be broken.

The following processes are integral to the nature and trajectory of human agency at the local levels:

◊ Destitution, Displacement, and Humanitarian Crisis.
Without the intervention of human agency, the destination of the pacification and immiseration cycles is the threat or reality of destitution for large portions of the local population, with little hope for corrective intervention from the human rights regime. This threat, combined with the ongoing onslaught of kinetic military and destructive development, creates the conditions for temporary or—more significantly—long term displacement, either in neighboring communities or neighboring countries At some point, this combination of destitution and displacement may lead the human rights regime to designate the calamity as a humanitarian crisis.

~262~
© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
The Painful Diversity of Resistance. Collective resistance can express itself in a variety of modalities, with local activism migrating from one form to another in response to the pacification cycle, to the changing social and physical conditions, and to the changing organization and material resources available. Ethnic conflict, terrorism, and black market drug cultivation are among the formats emergent in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with more straightforward modalities including attacks on occupation armed forces, sabotage and capture of economic facilities, and non-violent resistance ranging from union work action to institutional resistance within ad hoc or formal local, regional and even national government units.

The Tide of Resistance. Transformational military-primary intervention cannot achieve sustained quiescence in the subject population, even in settings where oppressive predecessor regimes had successfully imposed such passivity. This contrast derives from two factors: successful indigenous authoritarian regimes have a strong administrative presence across their domain, and they exploit, rather than transform, the local social and economic structure. These factors work to suppress resistance and make immiseration discontinuous. Military humanism, in contrast, annihilates the indigenous government and embarks on destructive development, thus presenting a panorama of continuous immiseration while depriving itself and its client regime of the administrative controls that might contain the resulting agitation. In this setting, the ebb and flow of resistance is marked by repeated crescendos.
Destitution, Displacement, and Humanitarian Crisis

For as long as the occupation continues to pursue the dual goals of military conquest and socio-economic transformation, the condition of local populations continues to decline. There can be no turning point (without the withdrawal of the occupying army), since both repacification and destructive development must necessarily generate further immiseration.

People faced with the threat or reality of destitution act to protect themselves or their families. These efforts can be either individual or collective, and within these modalities either passive or active, peaceful or violent. Individual action can include attempting to outwait the chaotic storm while working to sustain daily rounds; it can involve searching for new opportunities arising in the chaos, including (among some) predatory activities like robbery, kidnapping, or extortion; or it can lead to migration to distant locations with hoped-for better opportunities. Typically, there are individuals and families in any locality willing to try any of these options (and others), in various combinations.

The collective modality may also take many forms. All disasters generate ad hoc community-energized reconstruction efforts. These efforts mobilize the existing or emergent organizational capacity of civil society; in Iraq and Afghanistan these typically derived from tribal and/or religious formations, as well as remnants or reconstituted administrative elements of the ousted regime. Among other initiatives, these formations typically demand resources from the occupation or the newly installed political regime to fuel their reconstitutive (and/or predatory) efforts; or from the human rights regime, which might be mobilized around the potential (or already realized) crisis. In cases of military humanism like Iraq and Afghanistan, these projects often clash with the transformative agenda, and this contradiction may hinder or doom local reconstruction—or it may trigger increased violence.

When non-contentious collective efforts are unsuccessful, they tend to generate various forms of protest demanding additional resources or—where relevant—calling for the withdrawal of the occupation. Since even peaceful protest is a dangerous challenge to the fragile or absent legitimacy of the occupation and its client regime,
such protest—especially when it can be categorized as terrorism—is likely to trigger a new cycle of pacification, including the sort of punitive kinetic violence that is the hallmark of disputed sovereignty (Bjork 2010).

The mélange of individual and collective response to the immiseration cycle creates a kind of strategic stalemate that prevents either side—the occupation or the mostly local post-invasion formations—from enacting its agenda. At the national level, the occupation generally prevails: its military victory results in the installation of a regime with compliant leaders willing to (rhetorically at least) endorse the occupation and its transformational project. Despite propitious beginnings, however, neither the occupation nor the new government has an administrative presence in small villages, towns or urban neighborhoods, and therefore cannot impose its new program on the communities where ordinary people live. Ambitious programs, even oil drilling or electrical power stations, depend upon pacified local areas hosting the projects. For this reason, these large projects require the invasion of various areas in an attempt to apply the ‘clear, hold, and build’ strategy—one locality at a time—until a large stable area could be created capable of hosting these national initiatives. These efforts typically fail, but even when they succeed—as in Fallujah, where the devastation produced (temporarily) a quiescent community—the transformative reconstruction cannot create sustained on-the-ground progress. Instead, even unchallenged transformational reconstruction produces underfunding, corruption, and failure, exemplified by the aborted reconstruction in Fallujah and other projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the same time, the local formations are also unable to implement their own reconstruction. Most neighborhoods and communities are left to themselves as the occupation military operates elsewhere, and, therefore in principle, could choose—individually or collectively—to build or rebuild according to their own taste and goals—or rather according to the taste and goals of those who emerge as locally dominant. In the Sunni areas of Iraq, for example, these new formations usually reflected tribal, religious, and Ba'athist tendencies, sometimes mixed together and other times with one force emerging as dominant (Schwartz 2008). Such reconstruction efforts were inevitably dependent on commerce, supplies, and funding from
outside the community; and these resources were by-and-large not available in the debilitated political economy in Iraq. Locally-based reconstruction was therefore limited to minimal efforts aimed at preventing destitution as the economy wallowed in depression. Those communities that attracted regime-initiated pacification efforts suffered further decline and/or further transformative reconstruction efforts initiated by the occupation.

But even those areas that rarely saw or experienced a kinetic military presence could not lift themselves up. Many Shia cities south of Baghdad were never the site of pacification battles, and yet their economies slipped further and further into destitution as the weight of neoliberal transformation at the national level and the continued military campaigns, located elsewhere but affecting the country as a whole, led to the decay of commerce and infrastructure at the local level, and robbed them of needed economic foundations (Schwartz 2008). Even in Iraqi Kurdistan, where there was no fighting and no U.S. military presence, economic decline proceeded apace as the collapse of the larger economy deprived localities of the resources needed for sustenance (Schwartz 2008). One palpable sign of Kurdish destitution was the sweeping cholera epidemic in 2007, a disease that reflects malnutrition, contaminated water, and inadequate medical care (Lando 2007; Aljazeera 2007; UNHCR, 2007).

The continued presence of the occupation with its counterinsurgency strategy aimed at transformation thus guarantees the continued immiseration of the indigenous residents, whether or not they mount a disruptive or violent resistance campaign. In areas without a military presence, the lack of economic viability means an ongoing struggle with increasingly desperate adaptations as immiseration proceeds. Disorganized communities suffer from predatory criminality and other pathologies that further contribute to local decline. Proto-governments can range in their responsiveness to local needs, from oppressive warlords or religious tyrants to responsive collective leadership. The former may impose further depredations that serve their interest; the latter may ameliorate conditions. Both are likely to mobilize demands for needed resources from the occupation or the national government. In these circumstances, they may attract the kinetic attention of the occupation military and, perhaps, debilitating reconstruction, instituting another
cycle of immiseration.
At some point in this cycle the local area may become temporarily or permanently uninhabitable, triggering displacement and/or destitution for the local residents. When enough localities suffer this fate, the human rights regime may acknowledge a humanitarian crisis, since displacement is the high profile human rights condition most likely to attract international attention.

With or without such acknowledgment, the human rights regime, elaborately constructed in the last 40 years of the twentieth century, may enact a (non-military) humanitarian intervention aimed at ameliorating conditions in the impacted regions. The infernal logic of the pacification cycle, however, makes the delivery of ameliorative aid problematic at best. 92

◊ The sometimes constant threat or presence of violence circumscribes or prevents the operation of both UN agencies and NGOs, the mainstays of humanitarian aid. In these insecure areas, major humanitarian efforts are rarely mounted.

◊ In pacified locations, the occupation may welcome human rights activism, but only under the rubric of its policies and prescriptions, including its transformational agenda; such constrained conditions often preclude ameliorative aid to many local initiatives (Duffield 2001). In addition to constricting the distribution of aid that might stem the tide of immiseration, these constraints may lead local residents to identify humanitarian NGOs with the occupation. Aid organizations may then become targets of the insurgency, adding a military threat to their functioning.

◊ In relatively peaceful areas without a military presence (and perhaps a strong insurgent presence), NGO and UN activism is often barred by the occupation, if it sees humanitarian aid as providing aid and comfort to the insurgency, or
contributing to anti-transformational formations. In other settings, the resistance itself is hostile to the human rights regime, viewing the various groups as agents of the occupation and/or the incumbent regime.

The various combinations of these factors lead many humanitarian organizations to withhold or withdraw aid, seeing involvement as either too dangerous or as a compromise of their neutrality, since such participation would force them to support one side or the other of the ongoing confrontation.

In other humanitarian crises, caused by natural disasters and even internal wars, the delivery of ameliorative or preventive aid is fraught with logistic, political, and resource difficulties. Even so, the human rights regime has become a formidable force in the globalized world, accounting (by the beginning of the twenty-first century) for at least half of all humanitarian aid (Duffield 2001:53). In the setting of military humanism, however, the barriers to delivery are far more daunting, and in many instances the human rights regime has contented itself with measuring the extent of the crisis.

This impotence was illustrated by the bombing of the UN relief headquarters in Iraq in August 2003, killing 22 staff members, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The insurgent groups involved accused the United Nations (and its associated NGOs) of complicity with the occupation and followed the bombing with assaults on other elements of the humanitarian regime in Iraq, including a second attack on UN headquarters. By late September, the United Nations had withdrawn over 90% of its 600 member staff, a drastic downsizing matched by other major human rights groups.

While the UN did not formally withdraw from Afghanistan, it adopted a policy of reducing staff levels (and associated NGOs) in regions where security was an issue, severely compromising the viability of relief efforts (BBC 2003; Guardian 2009; Global Security 2011). Iraq and Afghanistan can be counted among the many...
conflict zones in which, as Nash (2011) has argued, humanitarian NGOs have been unable to cushion the direct and indirect impact of sustained military campaigns. Eventually the most visible presence of the HRR in both countries were reports on various human rights issues (UNHCR 2007; UNODC 2010), while the process of immiseration continued unabated.

The Diversity of Resistance

There are myriad forms to collective resistance. While all are directed at a perceived source of immiseration, the candidates for culpability are hopelessly diverse. Depending on the specific circumstances, and the various forces within the host society, differing targets and strategies emerge. These reactive strategies can be pro-active or reactive, constructive or destructive, violent or non-violent, focused or unfocused.

In considering the resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have so far gestured at the daily drumbeat of pro-active construction focused on local rebuilding, and on its contradictions with occupation actions and policy. We now consider two key patterns found in Iraq and Afghanistan, and which exemplify the variety of responses, both in their targets and their impact on the pacification/immiseration cycles.

The expectation of occupation and government leaders that the victims of immiseration will quietly accept their fate cannot be fulfilled. At least in the middle term, quiescence is always temporary because passivity does not interrupt the process of immiseration. The grinding degradation of conditions generates new humanitarian threats, with local residents seeing their families suffering from debilitating conditions threatening to destroy their own or their children’s future, or take their lives. This sort of calamity forces those enmeshed in these cycles to seek new solutions, sometimes individual, sometimes collective, usually peaceful, often disruptive, and sometimes violent.

Within these ongoing struggles lies a set of patterns that coalesce into collective action as the immiseration process proceeds and the occupation’s various strategies fail to pacify the country. The impossibility of stationing troops everywhere guarantees that suppressed local efforts will repeatedly revive, and in some places
begin to mature into stable local structures with sustained programs. These local efforts may vary in their responsiveness to local conditions and need, producing predatory criminality, religious jihadism, and brutal local warlords as well as organic local leadership with programs having the potential to serve local interests. Those efforts may provide the promise of an answer to the most pressing local needs for a modicum of livable resources and a hope for future demiseration; or they can further undermine the future prospects of the people they promise to serve.

Oil industry activism: an example of constructive destruction. The pre-existing or newly created civil society formations that coordinate these initiatives episodically coalesce around specific struggles. This coalescence may create horizontal networks among several or many communities, or reach upward in church hierarchies or local governments, sometimes operating at the level of national politics.

Transferring control of Iraqi petroleum production to international oil companies was an ongoing goal of the occupation, initiated soon after L. Paul Bremer ascended to the position of pro-consul. The resistance to this effort began inside the oil industry itself, among administrators, technicians, and workers employed by the state-owned oil companies. In one dramatic episode, Bremer announced transferring control of the southern port of Basra (which then handled 80% of the country’s oil exports) from a state-run enterprise to KBR, then a subsidiary of Halliburton, the company Vice President Cheney had once headed (Chatterjee 2009). Anticipating that their own jobs would soon disappear in a sea of imported labor, the oil workers immediately struck, paralyzing the port for three days. KBR withdrew from its newly signed contract, and Bremer abandoned the effort, restoring administration to the government agency that had run the harbor for decades. This early resistance thus frustrated one prong of the neoliberalization effort (Bacon 2005; Schwartz 2006b).

Though Bremer was unable to transfer control of whole oil fields or primary exploration to international oil companies, he did sign narrower short term contracts with various non-Iraqi energy and construction firms for repair or development of specific areas or facilities. The results were rarely adequate and often destructive,
reflecting both the ineffectiveness of outside contractors and the resourcefulness of the Iraqis who opposed the use of outside companies. Contracts for infrastructure repair or renewal were often botched or left incomplete, as international companies ripped out usable or repairable facilities that involved technology alien to them, and installed new, but often incompatible, equipment that compromised the functioning elements of the old system. In one instance, a $5 million pipeline repair became an $80 million ‘modernization’ project that foundered on intractable engineering issues and, three years later, was left incomplete (Glanz 2006). In more than a few instances, local communities actively sabotaged such projects, either because the contractors insisted on utilizing foreign technicians and workers instead of hiring Iraqis, or because the reconstruction would deprive the locals of what they considered their ‘fair share’ of oil revenues.

After an initial flurry of interest, international oil companies sized up the dangers of the situation and politely refused Bremer’s invitation—and the subsequent efforts by Iraqi governments—to risk billions of dollars on Iraqi energy investments.

After this initial failure, the Bush administration sought a new strategy to implement its oil ambitions. In late 2004, with Bremer out of the picture, Washington brokered a deal between U.S.-appointed interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in which European countries promised to forgive 25% of the debts accumulated by Saddam Hussein, and the Iraqis promised to implement the U.S. oil plan that would deliver oil field decision-making and operational control to international oil firms. This worked no better than Bremer’s earlier effort. Continued sabotage by insurgents, continued resistance by Iraqi technicians and workers, and the continued corrupt ineptitude of the contracting companies involved in development work made progress impossible. The international oil companies continued to stay away (Al-Ali 2004).

In 2007, under direct U.S. pressure, the third Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki forwarded virtually the same U.S.-authored policy to the Iraqi parliament for legislative consideration. Instead of passing the law, the Parliament established itself as a new center of resistance to the U.S. plan—raising myriad (already familiar) complaints and repeatedly refusing to bring it to a vote (Susman...
The stalemate continued unabated through the first year of the Obama administration, exemplified by the continuing conflict around the pipeline that carried oil from Iraq to Turkey, a source of about 20% of oil revenues (Lando 2009). During the Bremer administration, the U.S. had ended the Saddam era tradition of allowing tribal and other local leaders to siphon off a proportion of the oil passing through their territory, with the resulting revenues percolating through their communities. The occupation attempted to prevent this siphoning with the only weapon available—the occupation army—triggering innumerable firefights and retaliatory actions against oil pipelines. The ongoing political and military battles became an ongoing source of sustenance for both the political and violent resistance in the many communities involved.

In localities where the U.S. was successful in preventing the siphoning, the impacted communities fought back in various ways against what they saw as theft of their rightful resources, by the United States and its allies in the national government. Tribal leaders and other locals served by the siphoning process, under the banner of the insurgency, began systematic sabotage, a process facilitated by the hundreds of miles of almost-impossible-to-guard pipelines. By 2007, the insurgency had mounted 600 successful attacks against oil pipelines and facilities (Francis 2007; Brookings 2009:22).

Despite ferocious—often punitive—U.S. military offensives aimed at pacifying the communities deemed responsible, the northern pipeline remained closed for all but a few days in the six years from 2003 to 2009. The line was re-opened in fall 2009 when the Iraqi government, breaking free from U.S. discipline, restored the Saddam era custom of allowing local siphoning in exchange for discontinued sabotage. Shipments were nevertheless regularly interrupted as more militant fractions among the insurgency undertook 26 attacks on pipelines during the first three months after the agreement, based on their claim that the oil was illegitimately funding the continuing U.S. occupation. Attacks continued at a slower pace thereafter, rendering the pipeline inoperative for substantial periods of time (Lando 2010; Iraq Oil Report 2010).

The multifaceted resistance to the U.S.-sponsored oil policy illustrates the inevitability, tenacity, and diversity of the resistance to
the U.S. efforts to utilize military means to transform Iraqi, Afghan, or other targets of U.S. foreign policy. In the context of continued military occupation, such resistance takes its place as a part of the pacification cycle, becoming both provocation and justification for renewed, continued, or amplified military offensives that close the circle on another round of immiseration. At the same time, however, it can be counted as constructive, since it worked to frustrate the Bremer policy of delivering the oil to the international market economy, a process, which if enacted, would have contributed substantially to the debilitation of the Iraqi economy as a whole, and to the welfare of the localities that had been nurtured by the old distribution system.

One can conclude that the sabotage of the pipelines and other actions designed to frustrate U.S. oil policy was a form of constructive destruction, with all its dialectical imagery. Insofar as it limited oil revenues and therefore reduced resources that might have been used to ameliorate misery, it was destructive. Insofar as it frustrated the transformational agenda and thus interfered with the immiseration cycle, it was constructive. Insofar as it led to new rounds of pacification and immiseration, it was destructive. Insofar as it led the occupation to modulate its military or transformational ambitions—or contemplate withdrawal—is was constructive.

Parasitic activism. Not all collective resistance is constructive, even in the dialectical sense just discussed. In many instances, the grinding immiseration process set in motion by military humanism can exacerbate fault lines within the host society, focusing resistance in ways that contribute to the immiseration process. In Iraq, ethnic and religious divisions defined one such nexus of conflict. Beyond the long-standing history of Arab-Kurd confrontation, Shia-Sunni friction, which had not produced violence in 1000 years, devolved into terrorism and ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. It is important to note and understand the causal vectors that connect the pacification/immiseration cycles with this ethnic conflict, a significant instance of parasitic activism.95

As the impact of the occupation’s military actions and its economic program penetrated the various communities, guerrilla-based violent resistance began to proliferate, expressing itself
as small engagements, sniper attacks, and strategically placed improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—most aimed at stalling or diverting occupation incursions into insurgent neighborhoods. This guerrilla-type resistance accounted for the vast majority of the tens of thousands of engagements between the occupation and the insurgency. At first, residents of Sunni and Shia cities saw their local efforts as part of a larger joint struggle against the occupation, a solidarity that reached a high water mark when numbers of Shia insurgents left their communities to join the Sunni insurgents in the first battle of Fallujah.

By 2005, however, motivated by increasingly oppressive economic conditions, young Shia men joined the relatively well-paid, U.S.-commanded Iraqi army, and were assigned to campaigns against Sunni resistance fighters. A key moment occurred when units of Shia soldiers were ordered into the brutal second battle of Fallujah, and then remained to participate in the violent policing of the still rebellious population in the months after the fighting was over (see above; Schwartz 2006a).

From the beginning of the U.S. occupation, a tiny segment of the Iraqi Sunni community had resonated with the appeal of jihadist groups, who advocated terrorist attacks on the (mainly Shia) civilian supporters of the U.S.-led occupation. This appeal gained momentum in 2004 when the first elected government of Iraq, dominated by Shia politicians, provided rhetorical, legislative, and military support for the various occupation offensive against the growing Sunni-based insurgency. The destructive second battle of Fallujah, the first in which Shia troops participated, marked an inflection point for Sunni jihadist terrorist violence. The millions of outraged victims and witnesses to the slaughter led to a dramatic increase of willing martyrs. This led to the rising tide of car bombs and suicide attacks, aimed at ‘soft’ civilian targets that were considered gathering places for (mainly Shia) supporters of the occupation. Though the jihadists never accounted for more than 5% of the activists engaging in violent resistance and their attacks against civilian targets never accounted for more a tiny fraction of the insurgent military attacks (never more than 10%) and a small proportion of the more than one million civilian casualties during the years of heavy fighting, their (occasional) high mortality counts led the international media to make them the
centerpiece of news coverage for the next five years (Phillips and Roth 2008:20-24; Schwartz 2008).

As jihadist bombings increased in 2005, other forms of sectarian violence also began to develop, including ethnic cleansing. One vector in this development derived from the second battle of Fallujah. The forced evacuation of the city during the fighting, combined with the failure of reconstruction, produced about 100,000 displaced residents, most of whom migrated to already crowded Baghdad neighborhoods. The disorganization of these neighborhoods (based on the dismantling of the Hussein regime) became the enabling foundation for the Fallujah refugees to resolve their occupation-created homelessness by driving out Shia residents and taking possession of their vacated homes. By late 2005, this new form of reactive violence had gained momentum, fueled by the growing number of Sunnis displaced by fighting in various cities, and by the growing conviction among (still a tiny proportion of) Sunnis that retaliation against Shia supporters of the government and participation in the pacification was justified and/or necessary.

These various expressions of collective response to the pacification/imimseration cycles in Sunni communities then became a casual vector in evolving activism in the Shia areas of the country.97 During a year of intense suicide and car bomb attacks, and a growing tide of ethnic cleansing in mixed Baghdad neighborhoods, Shia civil society and religious organizations directed their (violent and non-violent) collective action at the occupation and its client government, demanding an end to occupation offensives and destructive development as well as protection against terrorist attacks.

By 2006, however, Shia groups began redirecting their activism against the Sunni community. The most visible of these initiatives were the death squads originally organized by U.S. military officers but later operating autonomously both inside and outside the Iraqi police system.98 The death squads invaded Sunni communities, often under cover of official police business, and captured, tortured and displayed the bodies of suspected insurgents. These death squads soon became the vanguard of the Shia side of ethnic cleansing. Targeted death squad attacks, often supplemented by U.S. military operations, drove Sunni families from targeted neighborhoods, replacing them with displaced Shia families.
This cycle of hatred, multiplied hundreds of times in various combinations, was the building block for the Sunni-Shia violence that wracked Baghdad in 2006-2008, causing—in conjunction with a series of ferocious U.S. military offensives aimed at ‘insurgent strongholds’ (including the much publicized ‘surge’)—the displacement of about 1,000,000 (mainly Sunni) Baghdad residents and the death of tens of thousands (Schwartz, 2008). The violence only ended when ethnic cleansing was more-or-less complete, with the previously integrated city locked into ethnic enclaves, and a large proportion of the defeated Sunnis driven from their homes and crowded into micro ghettos or displaced to other provinces or countries. In some sense, this massive humanitarian disaster represented a monstrous struggle over scarce resources needed for survival under the extreme immiseration generated by the ongoing effort of the United States to transform Iraq into an outpost for U.S. led-globalization.

This elaborate nexus of local collective action deepened the immiseration process throughout Baghdad: commerce ceased and residents fled, leaving behind isolated and dysfunctional communities incapable of sustaining the remaining population. In this sense, the nexus of terrorist attacks and ethnic cleansing were parasitic—contributing to the pacification/immiseration cycle by adding new dimensions of violence while deepening immiseration.

In Afghanistan, the physical separation of Pashtun from other ethnic groups made sectarian violence less likely and less prevalent. But other forms of parasitic activism evolved out of the immiseration dynamics developed there. When NATO arrived in late 2001, opium cultivation was at an historically low ebb, constituting a tiny fraction of the economy. But the ensuing cycle of degradation made existing crops impossible to profitably cultivate, while giving unique advantages to opium, which could be processed into an easily carried form, and transported out of the country by non-mechanized means. It became the only viable crop, but it brought with it the criminal culture that further oppressed local residents, even while they embraced its cultivation (McCoy 2010; UNODC 2010; Prupis 2011).

The opium economy and its attendant criminality very quickly became the material foundation for Afghan resistance to the occupation, including the various groups loosely affiliated under the
‘Taliban’ banner, at least in the eyes of the western media. Opium cultivating communities were particularly resilient to the episodic incursions of NATO troops, and therefore the occupation worked with the Northern Alliance, a group of locally based warlords who were skilled at establishing and sustaining a dominant presence within the various regions of the countries. In areas where the members of the Northern Alliance had a social base, they could—strengthened by U.S. supplied resources—purge the local resistance. They did not, however, eliminate the opium trade, which was too lucrative and too essential to the local economy to attempt its suppression. This ascendance of the Northern Alliance also facilitated the re-imposition of the various pathologies associated with Afghan warlordism, including the extreme sexism that is most often associated with the Taliban, but is also a hallmark of the Northern Alliance.99

The evolution of collective resistance is constrained by the vectors of causality created by the pacification/immiseration cycles and by the particularities of the localities in which it develops. It is in the nature of the sorts of military-primary interventions discussed here that the individual and collective resistance will percolate upward from specific communities and only find broadly based consistency as an emergent phenomenon. The elaborate nature of this process and the causal contingencies that impact upon it explain the immense range found within and between countries. What unites the locally based strikes against newly enacted oil policies, agricultural initiatives in farming communities, IED attacks on patrolling military forces, and ethnic cleansing of communities is that they all arise in response to the grinding process of immiseration that emanates from the pacification cycle.

The Rising Tide of Resistance

Ordinary working people can and do passively absorb oppression for long periods without engaging in contentious resistance. Collective activism—no matter what form it takes—is the contra-positive of such passivity. In the context of military humanism, the engine of such resistance is the prospect of continuous degradation. As soon as people feel that inaction will guarantee further immiseration and that failure to act will threaten the lives of their family and children, they will then take action to prevent this
definitive calamity. If this first response does not end the continuing decline—if the prospect of calamity is not removed—there will inevitably be yet another action, individual or collective, predatory or communal, and ultimately constructive or parasitic. As long as immiseration shows no sign of ending, there will be fresh efforts by those impacted to stem the tide of destitution, including a full measure of collective effort.

The logic of occupation contains an assumption that the indigenous population will eventually accept the reality of their situation without further resistance. This assumption rests on the indisputable longevity of many oppressive regimes—including the survival of the predecessor regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan (though the Taliban were famously unable to fully pacify the country). This longevity raises the question of why neither the Iraqis nor the Afghans lapsed into the same passivity after the U.S.-led invasion that had characterized their ultimate reaction to the Hussein and Taliban regimes.

The tenacity of the resistance to the U.S.-imposed regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan (and to other regimes similarly imposed) derives from the pacification/immiseration cycle, which created a dynamic quite different from the predecessor regimes. While both the Hussein and Taliban regimes generated immiseration over the course of their reign, it was neither uniform nor relentless, as the process imposed by the U.S. has been. For the most part, oppression of various sectors occurred in large and sudden bursts, followed by periods of stability or even progress, so that certain sectors of society or regions of the country experience immiseration at any given time. This sort of pulsing oppression generates ample protest, but it tends to be concentrated in the targeted areas, with other regions or social segments remaining quiescent. The entrenched regime can then focus its attention on the rebellious areas, and utilize its established institutions to suppress the resistance.

The transformative agenda integral to military humanism practiced by the United States does not allow for this strategy of suppression. In the first instance, the transformational goals, enacted at the national level as the occupation begins, guarantees that immiseration will impact large segments of the country simultaneously, and thus assure widespread resistance and eventually
protest and even rebellion. The suppressive task is at least one magnitude greater than that faced by the Taliban or Hussein.

At the same time, the transformational goals require the annihilation of the existing government and its administrative apparatus. In destroying this structure, the occupation is depriving itself of a valuable tool for both anticipating and suppressing protest. Successful destruction of local administration leaves the occupation without a presence in the various communities, and therefore makes it hard to identify and liquidate either centers of resistance or indigenous counter-institutions.

Neither the Hussein regime nor the Taliban regime destroyed local structures when they ascended to power. Instead, they coopted the prior structure, attempting to make them agents of their rule. This process of cooptation was feasible precisely because neither were intent on replacing the existing infrastructure or revolutionize life at the local level. When they did institute changes, they did so piecemeal and gradually.

In Iraq, the policies enacted by Hussein that created the dynamics of immiseration did indeed generate rebellion, though he was far more effective than the United States in suppressing it. His effectiveness flowed from the national government's administrative presence in virtually all localities, which could identify the sources of opposition and support to the regime’s policies, and enact responses suited to the nature of the threat. Only in Kurdistan was his apparatus inadequate to the task, and these provinces eventually established meaningful autonomy that made further depredations impractical. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was less successful, they could never integrate many provinces which remained under the rule of the war lords of Northern Alliance.

By annihilating the existing government in both countries, the U.S.-led occupation deprived itself of the key tools for controlling resistance, the tools that both the Taliban and Hussein regimes utilized to suppress rebellion in various locations. Once rebellion began—in far more areas than the predecessor regimes had faced—the only tool of suppression was the application of overwhelming firepower by the U.S. military, a device guaranteed to generate further resistance.

The denouement of this element in the pacification cycle is
that the absence of a viable government apparatus assures room to maneuver for the resistance, no matter how poorly organized it might be. Once the pressure of the military is relieved (and often, even before), the absence of a viable governmental apparatus provides two resources to the resistance. In the first instance, it allows space for reconstruction efforts to be developed without interference, and in the second instance, credit for any progress cannot be claimed by the occupation, which has no presence.

At the end of each cycle, the community finds that it was the resistance, not the occupation, which answered their needs, even if only in the most meager way. In Iraq, the siphoning of oil, fought for and won by the resistance, vivified the local economy (in sharp contrast to the immiseration offered by the occupation) if only because the proceeds were spent in the local community, but also if they are applied to social endeavors, as they often were. In Afghanistan, the resistance nurtured the opium crop and generated income for local farmers, while the occupation destroyed their livelihood. In the face of this pattern, the resistance tended to gain legitimacy within the communities. And when the resistance failed to provide amelioration, the next cycle produced a new chance or a new type of resistance.

As time elapses, the occupation must experience declining legitimation. Its kinetic operations produce increased anger and rebellion, thus undermining the credibility of the occupation as a military force. Its reconstruction operations contribute to immiseration, thus undermining its credibility as a positive economic force. Over time the legitimacy shifts away from the regime, either to an increasingly coherent opposition, or towards the various local efforts that log partial successes.

PART VI - CONCLUSION

Oppressive regimes, like those that preceded the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, remain in power based upon the judicious application of violence. By targeting one sector of society for immiseration or suppression, while leaving others (temporarily or permanently) unaffected, the resistance can be isolated and contained, if not suppressed. This sort of selectivity must, in some large way, rely on a kind of conservatism, in which the structures and arrangements
under which most people live remained intact most of the time. This sort of conservatism creates a kind of stability that even the most violently oppressive regime requires if it is to avoid generalized disruption and rebellion. In its essence, it avoids a generalized spiral of immiseration that extends into diverse regions and communities.

The U.S. project in the Middle East, to ‘reshape the culture of the Islamic world,’ required a wholesale transformation of the host societies (Hastings 2010). However appealing that might be to those who saw Iraq and Afghanistan as wholly corrupt or dysfunctional societies, such wholesale transformation implies an immiseration process reaching into every nook and cranney of the host country.

It is precisely the ambitiousness of the goals that guarantees that resistance would extend across otherwise important divisions and—at least on occasion—unite large numbers of otherwise dispersed groupings, fractions, and classes into generalized resistance. In seeking to suppress the disruptive or violent collective resistance, the absence of viable government and the presence of a powerful military produce the often-spectacular degradation of the pacification cycle. At some point, the most visible aspects of this cycle—most often population displacement and refugee flows into neighboring countries—activate the human rights regime. Under certain physical and political circumstances the plight of the people enmeshed in this cycle may receive the publicity consonant with an internationally recognized humanitarian crisis.

The never-ending struggle over oil in Iraq illustrated this process. The U.S. project to transfer control to international oil companies immediately mobilized the cadre of technicians and bureaucrats whose jobs depended on the continued viability of the state-owned oil companies they worked in or presided over. Very quickly, it mobilized the workers in the oil and related industries, who perceived the threat of foreign workers to their jobs. It mobilized local leaders, who sought to defend the custom of local siphoning, which would disappear under foreign control. And so it went. Ultimately, the protest percolated outward and upward, including violent attacks on pipelines and oil construction projects, and parliamentary opposition to enabling legislation.

In the meantime, the occupation military used kinetic methods in an attempt to suppress the resistance and impose a set of
economic reforms that sought to supplant local structures (such as siphoning). The combined consequences of these struggles deepened the immiseration, rendering local areas incapable of supporting the lives of their residents (as in Fallujah), and triggered the displacement that most typically sounds the alarms of the human rights regime.

Similarly, the problem of water purity spread immiseration from one sector to another as its impact extended into far corners of Iraqi society. As it did so, it mobilized various segments in various ways. Fishing boats were idled and their crews set about searching for jobs and protesting their unemployment, farmers sought remedies and ultimately migrated to cities searching for new work, while calling for restoration of the water. Consumers, deprived of affordable products and forced to buy imports, began demanding state support to handle inflated prices. The protests triggered military suppression and further degradation of local life, leading to shifting targets and changing tactics. In 2009, the Shia and Sunni communities—only recently separated by religious and ethnic divisions that had generated massive ethnic cleansing—coalesced around eliminating electrical shortages as a solution to water contamination and other problems. In 2010, the protests involving an estimated one million people had reached upward to the national government, extracting a promise of using oil revenues to reconstruct the government-operated electrical grid, abandoning the U.S.-imposed commitment to privatization.

The underlying diversity of the discontent and the absence of national administration in the public or civil sectors assures that most collective action will be local, but the evolution and dynamics of continuous organizing also guarantees moments of coordination when many sectors coalesce around specific or more general issues—even after damaging internecine warfare. This coalescence may be temporary or relatively durable, successful or unsuccessful. It may appear in one form and then another. For a time, in Iraq there was a huge and very visible insurgency. At other times, electoral protest was the primary form of expression. Still other times, various localities sought to operate almost as city-states, seeking to autonomously deliver specific reconstitutive programs to their residents.

The generalized discontent produced by these pacification/immiseration cycles at least sometimes percolates into all the durable and temporary structures of the host society. Despite the best efforts
of the U.S. occupation to construct compliant client regimes, even the most docile leaders find themselves buffeted by the demands of the always-developing institutions they must rely on in order to govern, and through them the percolated demands of ordinary citizens. In Iraq, President Nouri al-Maliki faced a Parliament that had become a center of resistance to the oil laws that the U.S. advocated. The oil ministry, partly in defense of its own institutional power and partly in response to the voices from diverse segments of the population, sought contracts with oil companies that did not transfer decision-making over development and production to the global market. The electrical ministry extracted a promise of billions of oil money to rebuild the old electrical grid, abandoning the U.S. program of privatizing the electrical industry into the hands of multinational corporations.

In Afghanistan, a similar process also took hold. Starting with the re-institutionalization of sexism, President Karzai became increasingly responsive to internal demands contradictory to U.S. preferences. His pursuit of negotiations with the Taliban was a key element in his evolution toward independence.

Resistance to the transformative project initiated by the United States and initially imposed by the military was continuous within both countries from the beginning of the occupation. The forms it took and the demands it made migrated from one node to another, ebbing and flowing according to the complex rhythm created by the pacification/immiseration cycles, and the response by the multitude of sectors impacted by them. What is inevitable is that the resistance will be constantly renewed, rebuilt and rejuvenated for as long as the transformative project is pressed; and that the conflict will continue until the occupation is ended or the transformative project abandoned.

Ultimately, the goal of marrying military conquest and economic transformation is doomed not just to failure, but to generate humanitarian crisis and endless rebellion.

References


~286~

© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011


~287~

© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011


Hamden, Toby. 2004. ‘Fallujah will be your Stalingrad, Americans Told.’ Daily Telegraph April 16.


~288~

© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011


© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011

~289~


Nash, Kate. 2011. Forthcoming. ‘States of Human Rights.’ Sociologica 1


© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011


~292~

© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011


Endnotes

1. See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman’s seminal work, Globalization: The Human Consequences (1998). See also Shaw (2001). The widely read Globalization Reader, now in its third edition, utilizes this typology to organize key readings in the field (Lechner and Boli, 2009).

2. For a particularly eloquent treatment of communication and transportation, see Bauman, Chapter 1.

3. Even in Zygmunt Bauman’s admirable synthetic effort (1998), various elements are treated in separate chapters with sparse but illuminating connecting analyses.

4. For important reviews of neoliberal globalization processes, see Harvey (2003, 295).

5. For a persuasive argument that warmaking itself has become globalized, see Shaw (2005, especially Chapter 3).


7. For a vivid history of several recent humanitarian crises, see Polman (2010)

8. For a definition of international regimes, see Krasner, 1982, as well as the special issue of International Organization which his essay introduces. For analyses of the origins and dynamics of international human rights regimes, see Donnelly 1986, 2006. For details of the United Nations contribution, see Mingst and Karns 2007. For discussion of human rights groups and social movements, see Weist and Smith, 2012 (forthcoming).

9. For important analyses of these dynamics, see Harvey (2003, 2006), Wood (2003), Smith (2005), Klein (2007).

10. For various treatments of the transnational capitalist class, with or without this label, see Robinson and Harris (2000), Harris (2001, 2011), Sklair (2001), Harvey (2003), Bauman (1998).

11. For analyses of how these global institutions impact state and economic policies, and the collateral consequences on the host countries see Klein, 2007, Wade (2004), Sfglitz (2003). For assessments of impact on particular sectors, see Shandra et al. (2011) on forests, Kim et al. (2002) on health.

12. Much of the literature on such interventions has sought to evaluate its efficacy. For useful work on this subject, see Downes (2007a, 2007b, 2008), Fortna (2003).


14. See also Harris, 2003, Wallerstein 2003, Dodge, 2006; Klein 2008; Schwartz 2009, among many others.


16. See also Dodge (2009, 2010).


18. Many analyses do not distinguish between SMOs and human rights NGOs, with some reviews grouping both under the broader rubric of civil society (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsun (2005)), while others include only NGOs (adopting neutral or non-partisan stances while focusing on monitoring and service delivery) in the HRR (e.g., Kuperman (2009a)). A growing body of literature,
however, asserts the need for a separate analysis of activist SMOs engaging in contentious politics aimed at policy and social change, distinguishing them from NGOs adopting a neutral and/or non-partisan stance toward domestic or international government (Smith (2008); Smith and Weist (2012)).

19. The literature on transnational SMOs is less codified. For information on SMOs as part of the human rights regime, see Keck and Sikkink (1998); Smith (2008); Smith and Weist (2012). For information on the World Social Forum and other meta-movements, see Fisher and Ponniah (2003), Santos (2006), Smith et al. (2007). For discussion of the efficacy of SMOs (as well as broader civil society efforts), see Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), Nash (2009). For an insightful data driven analysis of how SMOs work within the HRR to effect change, see Tsutsui and Shin’s investigation of the Korean minority’s struggle to acquire human rights in Japan (2006).


21. Among the significant contributions to the scholarship on humanitarian military intervention are Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003), Finnemore (2003: particularly Chapter 3) and Bass (2008). Useful citations to this literature can be found in Mingst and Karns (2007: Chapter 4, especially p. 112n37). On R2P, see ICISS (2001), Kuperman (2009b). For a list of UN sponsored interventions since the 1990s, see Kuperman (2009b: 19-20), Donnelly (2006: 14), Mingst and Karns (2007: 98). For a review of the literature, and a persuasive argument that peacekeeping and peacebuilding were often successful in forestalling renewed hostilities, see Fortna (2003).

22. Finnemore (2003) traces the beginning of modern military intervention to India’s 1971 intervention in the region of Pakistan that would ultimately become Bangladesh, carried out under the banner of protecting civilians from human rights violations by Pakistan’s army. In Finnemore’s analysis, this instance and other unilateral interventions in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Tanzania in Uganda and Vietnam in Cambodia) were not ‘legitimate in contemporary politics’ because ‘humanitarian intervention must be multilateral.’ See also Kuperman (2009a) and Duffield (2001: 57).

23. Quotations are from Finnemore (2003: 136, 135); see also Barnett and Finnemore, 1999. For an elaboration of this argument, arguing that the coupling of security and human rights is part of a larger globalized nexus including neoliberal economic development, see Duffield (2001: Chapter 3, especially pp. 51f).


27. There is no satisfactory definition of military intervention, as distinguished from other kinetic military action, including war. See Finnemore for a useful treatment of this ambiguity (2003: Chapter 1).

28. Key works in this area include Schelling (1966), Pape (1996), Carr (2002), Asprey (2004), Valentino (2004), Finnemore (2003), and Downes (2008). For a good entry point into this literature, see Downes (2007b), which introduces a special...
issue of *Civil Wars* (volume 9, no. 4, December 2007), containing key contributions, as well as references to much of the literature up to that time. See also Arreguin-Toft (2001, especially notes 26-31). For a review and analysis of civilian targeting by the United States, see Tirman (2011).

29. See Downes (2006, 2007a) for statements of the applicability of this work to humanitarian interventions.

30. See also Downes (2007a, 2007b)

31. Arreguin-Toft (2001: 101). According to Arreguin-Toft, ‘Historically, the most common forms of barbarism include the murder of noncombatants (e.g., prisoners of war or civilians during combat operations); the use of concentration camps; and since 1939, strategic bombing against targets of no military value.’

32. Shaw (2005) interprets the civilian casualties in these wars as a byproduct of the commitment of the United States and its allies to minimize casualties to its own troops.

33. Even though human rights concerns were offered as a part of the vocabulary of motives for the three focal interventions, Nash sees the interventions themselves as motivated by Realpolitik, with the human rights violations a byproduct of actions taken ‘on the basis of ‘raison d’etat’ concerning security and access to resources.’

34. Duffield (2001; especially Chapters 3-5) offers a sustained argument that post-Soviet humanitarian intervention has adopted economic development as a primary goal, resting this transformational intention on the belief that without development, the host society will return to its pre-intervention patterns.

35. Modern history is filled with economically motivated military action, including the overthrow of local regimes poised to nationalize foreign-owned industries (e.g., Guatemala, 1954) and the use of military invasion to collect debts owed to foreign investors (e.g., Nicaragua, Morocco and Turkey in the 1870s). However, these aimed at changing government policies vis-à-vis various economic interests and did not seek to directly intervene in economic activity (Finnemore, 2003: Chapter 2). For a detailed catalogue and description of U.S. military interventions since World War II, together with their economic purposes and consequences, see Blum (2008).

36. Petraeus (2009: 16), emphasis added. For a similar commitment, enunciated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, see Clinton (2010).

37. See Part I above for the traditional view of military intervention. See also, Finnemore (2003: Chapter 4) for an account of the changes in the vision and purpose of military intervention over the past two centuries.


40. For an important analysis of the differences between Middle East state-directed development (and also, China, India, and Russia) and the policies associated with neoliberalism, see Harris (2009).

41. For an extended discussion of the melding of military, humanist and neoliberal goals during the 1990s, see Duffield (2001: Chapters 3-5). Duffield does not, however, anticipate the military-primacy aspect of U.S. policy after 9-11. See also, ~298~

© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011
In late 2008, the Bush Administration negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be withdrawn by December 31, 2011. It was this commitment that Petraeus (and subsequent Obama Administration documents and actions) referenced in discussing the long-term role of the U.S. military in Iraq, including frequent gestures towards modifying the SOFA to extend the military presence there (see Schwartz, 2010; Healy and Schmidt, 2011).

This reference to continued influence evokes Bjork’s (2010) image of punitive wars as efforts to extend sovereignty.

General Petraeus had literally, in 2006, ‘written the book’ on counterinsurgency (Petraeus and Amos, 2006).

Krasner is also an influential International Relations scholar, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, before and after his service at State. His concept of shared sovereignty complements Bjork’s (2010) argument that punitive wars are fought in regions of contested sovereignty.

In his formulation of shared sovereignty, Krasner argues that it is most useful when the host government lacks legitimacy, and the successful implementation of new policy is carried forward by a more capable outside partner. This dovetails with Bundt’s expectation that U.S. primacy in the planning and implementation process of an ultimately successful endeavor would ‘augment the legitimacy’ of the Iraqi government (Krasner, 2005: 70-2).

The unwillingness of the State Department to depend upon Iraqi police and military for this protection was symptomatic of their lack of faith in the competence of these forces and/or their lack of coverage in the many locations that Embassy-headquartered agencies operated in. Beyond these sources of dis-confidence lay the deeper suspicion, prevalent from the early days of the occupation, that Iraqi forces, even those supplied, trained, and supervised by U.S. officers, were unwilling to fight to protect personnel from—or employed by—the U.S. occupation.

Ellick (2010). U.S. officials justified their close supervision of their aid expenditures as a necessary measure to control corrupt contractors.


For a pointed and insightful treatment of the contrast and friction between state-centered capitalism in the Middle East (and in China and Russia) and neoliberal capitalism captained by the U.S., see Harris (2009).


54. The neo-conservatives, who spoke most forcefully about destroying indigenous regimes, were particularly vociferous on the subject of Saudi Arabia, despite its long term alliance with the United States, dating back to the end of World War II. See, for example, the forceful analysis of Reuel Marc Gerecht (2004). Gerecht was a director of the Project for a New American Century, a policy formation organization that sent key personnel (including Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz) to the George W. Bush administration.
55. In Afghanistan, the various warlords allied with NATO maintained significant administrative capacity in their domains; in Iraq, indigenous leadership had effectively governed the Kurdish provinces, under the protection of the U.S.-led ‘no fly zone.’ Only meager administrative remnants remained intact in the Pashtun territory of Afghanistan and the Shia and Sunni areas of Iraq. For Iraq, see Rosen (2006a) and Jamail (2007). For Afghanistan, see Jones (2006a), Suhrke (2007, 2008).
56. For a detailed account of this process in Iraq, see Schwartz (2008).
57. When theorists of war refer to Iraq and Afghanistan, they distinguish between the initial conventional wars, which ended rather quickly, from the period of ‘post conflict,’ in which ‘political and social reconstruction’ was primary (Crane and Terrill, 2003:11; Shaw, 2005: 113). In earlier wars, this distinction worked well, because the initial battles were followed by a longer or shorter period of dramatically less violence. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the preponderance of the fighting, casualties, and infrastructural disruption took place after the conventional war had ended and the anticipated phase of reconstruction had begun.
58. For vivid accounts of these on-the-ground military actions in Iraq, see Rosen (2006a), Jamail (2007), and Tirman (2011). For descriptions and statistics in Afghanistan, see Gall (2011).
59. See, for example, the battles in Habaniya, Baiji and on Haifa Street in Baghdad (Schwartz, 2008).
60. For useful descriptions of the brutality and immiseration of targeted families and communities in Afghanistan, see Gall (2011). For Iraq, see Tirman (2011)
61. The elaborate field manual for applying counterinsurgency strategy was written by Petraeus and James F. Amos (2006). The publication of this manual heralded the revival of COIN, long dormant after the defeat in Vietnam had discredited it, but revitalized by its application in Iraq, and subsequently institutionalized as Petraeus (the co-author) rose in stature due to his position as Iraq commander during the period when levels of violence declined precipitously. When Obama appointed Petraeus as commander of CENTCOM, the new commanding general announced the application of COIN to Afghanistan as his major military initiative. See also Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 213-236).
62. Hastings (2010). Macgregor saw this effort as hopeless: ‘The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people…. The idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense.’
63. See Polman (2010) and Jones (2006a) for the virtues and dangers of this approach.
64. For the philosophical underpinnings of this stance, see Doyle (1983a, 1983b, 1986).
66. Chandrasekaran, 2010, see also Whitlock, 2010. A not insignificant element in the creation of ‘this bleeding ulcer’ was conceded by the U.S. military later in 2010: two official reports estimated that at least 80% of those arrested during the surge (and perhaps an equal proportion of those killed), had not been Taliban activists or insurgents of other complexions. These arrests then became a part of the culture of resistance, demonstrating to locals that avoiding involvement in resistance would not make them safe from the kinetic attacks by the NATO occupation (Porter Crane and Terrill (2003:44, see also18, 20,23, 31, 42f, 63f)).
67. Even American military officers publicly conceded an increase in ‘violence,’ marking the May 2011 level as 15% above a year earlier (Filkins, 2011).
68. For exceptions to this pattern, see Suhrke (2007, 2008), Finnemore (2003), Dodge (2010), Tirman (2011) and Part I above.
69. For a parallel scholarly treatment of the military role in pre-1990 wars, see Kaldor (2007: Chapters 2-3). Kaldor offers a particularly detailed and informative analysis of military-civilian relationships in the Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention (Chapter 3).
70. Crane and Terrill ((2003:44, see also18, 20,23, 31, 42f, 63f). Astore and Engelhardt (2011) argue that this version of military-primacy has become the defining feature of U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century.
71. See also Kaldor’s detailed consideration of the negative impact of the Iraq war (2007: Chapter 7) on human rights in Iraq. She does not focus on the non-kinetic aspects of the military role.
72. It is worth noting that Marja and other surge-created ‘build’ projects involved few of the mainstays of the human rights regime. This was partly an expression of the military-primacy policy, which placed emphasis on direct participation of military personnel or the use of capitalist subcontractors in roles regularly played by the HRR; it was partly a reflection of the ongoing fighting that made the sites too dangerous for unprotected human rights workers; and it was partly an unwillingness of many NGOs to participate in projects that would compromise their stance of neutrality by aligning them with the occupation. See Jones (2006a, 2006b, 2009, 2010), Polman (2010).
73. For an analysis of the parallel problems in Iraq, see Klein (2007), Schwartz (2008).
74. For an insightful discussion of the role of opium cultivation in the post-911 Afghan economy, see Jones (2006b).
75. This account, including all quotes, is taken from Gall and Khapalwak (2011). For a more general analysis of the role of road building in Afghanistan, see Tirman (2011: 275).
76. These ambitions were reported by New York Times reporters Gall and Khapalwak (2011), based on interviews with Canadian military officers commanding troops in the Kandahar region.
77. A substantial proportion of this cost reflected the decrepit condition of the infrastructure before the U.S. attack, a result of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s,
the UN-endorsed Gulf War in 1990, the draconian sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s, and the corruption of the Hussein regime (Schwartz, 2008: Part I).

78. This account is based on Chatterjee (2004, 2009), Jamail (2007), and Schwartz (2008, Part III).


81. An exemplar of the relationship between occupation and indigenous corruption can be seen in the 2011 findings of a British Parliamentary investigation identifying 21 billion pounds of development money ‘squandered’ by the U.S. government. Included in the lost money was the $900 million in the Kabul Bank scandal, making the predominant instance of Afghan corruption a tiny fraction of the overall losses by the United States (Famer, 2011; Gutcher, 2011; Jelinek, 2011).

82. See, for example, the experiences of Chile, Argentina, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and other settings in which a sitting government enacted neoliberal policies without the mediation of outside military intervention. In most of these settings, multinational investors found profitable investments, though these projects did not usually result in immediate or long term benefits for the indigenous population.


84. For Bremer’s orders relating to privatization, see Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 198-200). For a USAID document expressing the logic behind this policy, see Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 400-2).

85. This account is based on Schwartz (2008: Ch. 4) and Juhasz (2006: Ch. 7). For the definitive account of oil economics and politics in post-Hussein Iraq, see Mutri (2011).

86. For Hague Convention documents rendering Bremer’s actions illegal, see Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 168-9, 295-7).

87. In 2009, major international oil companies finally began signing development contracts with the Iraqi government, but they did not approach the terms that Bremer had originally offered. If enacted as written, the oil development contracts would strengthen the Iraqi government and permit it to re-establish the sort of economic control that the Hussein regime had maintained, thus defeating the long term U.S. goal of opening and transforming it into an outpost for globalized markets. But even in this context, the actual investment had not yet been activated, as the oil companies paused to determine if their investment was secure. See Schwartz (2010).

88. This confidence rested mainly on Kurdish regional government’s ten-year control over its three-province domain. This stability had been established soon after the 1990 Gulf War, when it declared its autonomy from the Hussein regime, defending it with the help of the United States imposed ‘no fly zone’ that had protected it from Hussein regime aerial offensives (see Schwartz, 2008: Part IV).

89. On collective responses to natural disasters, see Solnit (2009), Clarke (2002);
This account is taken from Schwartz (2008: Chapters 14-17).

91. In the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, the dominant force was loosely or tightly connected to the Taliban, though the reconstituted Taliban was somewhat different in theory and practice from its power-holding predecessor.

92. This argument is based on material found in Polman (2010), Nash (2009), Duffield (2002: Chapters 3-4), Kuperman (2009a), Jones (2011).

93. For a vivid account of the meager successes of the HRR in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion, see Jones (2006a).

94. Unless otherwise noted, this account is taken from Chatterjee (2009), Muttritt (2011) and Schwartz (2006b, 2008: Chapter 4).


96. On the number of insurgent attacks over the years, see Brookings (2009).

97. This account is based on Schwartz (2008, Chapter 18).

98. This account is based on Hirsh and Barry (2005), Jamail (2006: 244-7); Schwartz (2008: 210-16; 245-63). For background on the Latin American origins of U.S. death squad development, see Grandin (2007).

99. Jones (2006b, 2009); because of this nexus the Karzai regime had formally re-adopted many of the previously abolished forms of institutional sexism (Borger, 2009).


Michael Schwartz is the chair of the sociology department and the founding director of the College of Global Studies. His most recent book, War Without End: The Iraq War in Context, describes the causes and consequences of the Iraq war, analyzing how the roots of the war in the militarized geopolitics of oil led the U.S. to dismantle the Iraqi state and economy while fueling sectarian civil war inside Iraq. Schwartz is the author of award winning books on popular protest and insurgency (Radical Protest and Social Structure), and on American business and government dynamics (The Power Structure of American Business, with Beth Mintz). His work on militarized U.S. foreign policy has appeared in numerous academic and popular outlets, including TomDispatch, Asia Times, Mother Jones, Cities and Contexts.